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OUR LEGAL CHAMELEON, THE FLORIDA
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION: I-III
HAROLD B. CROSBY AND GEORGE JOHN MILLER
The Florida homestead exemption is at once the great bulwark of the
individual homeowner and a formidable barrier to creditors and county
and municipal fiscal authorities. To the intending alienor it is frequently
a pitfall, and to many a testator or trustor it is the fatal rock upon which
he is lured by the sirens of full and free choice in leaving his property.
To the general practitioner, however, it is more often than not a chame-
leon, which changes color to accord with the background against which
he is viewed.
The same individual, living on the same property, can enjoy a home-
stead exemption taxwise and yet find himself with no exemption from
forced sale.' Conversely, the same individual, owning a house and grounds,
may find that it is free from levy for all debts of his father, or mother,
or both, but that he is nonetheless liable for taxes on its full assessed
valuation. 2 He will discover in any event, whether he is entitled to a
tax exemption or nor, that freedom from execution never bars enforce-
ment of a valid tax judgment. The homestead provisions do not con-
stitute a law of descent, he is told, yet he dare not plan his estate, or
while living convey his realty, without observing strictly the homestead
limitations.3  Their influence extends even into the fields of federal
taxation 4 and Florida tax titles.5
Our chameleon does have form, however, and his alleged obscurity re-
sults in most instances from failure to determine at the outset the precise
background upon which he is resting and to bear constantly in mind that
'E.g., a bachelor residing alone in Florida in a house that he owns.
'E.g., assume father, mother and dependent son residing in the father's house in
Florida. The father dies intestate and leaves the mother as head of the family.
She dies soon afterward; the son goes to live permanently with an uncle and rents
the former family home to tenants.
'Discussed in Part II infra. We shall see that as a practical matter the judiciary
has gradually converted a part of the homestead provisions into a law of descent,
in spite of reluctance to admit the metamorphosis.
'Discussed in Part V infra.
5E.g., the ten-year redemption period granted a homesteader against a Murphy
Act purchaser of a tax sale certificate; FLA. STAT. §192.36 (1941), Golden v. Grady,
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OUR LEGAL CHAMELEON
as he moves rapidly from one setting to another the same form appears
in strikingly different colors. At times, also, separate and distinct chame-
leons, one of one size and one of another, perch on a single object. Thanks
to the early draftsmen in this field, who, if they did not write too well,
at least refrained from writing too much, and to a Supreme Court that
for decades has shown a high degree of sound common sense and logical
consistency in the interpretation of most of the homestead provisions,
there exist today definite contours that remain distinguishable amid the
camouflage of varying factual situations.
Without purporting to anticipate every conceivable question that might
be asked, this article does attempt to delineate the main principles. The
sharpest conceptual distinction falls between exemption from forced sale
and exemption from taxation; accordingly, Part V of this article deals
witfi the latter. Part I analyzes the steps required for ascertaining the
existence of the exemption of homestead realty from forced sale; Part II
covers the inurement of this exemption and its influence on the trans-
fer of homestead realty; Part III explains the difference between the
realty and personalty exemptions from the standpoint of both forced sale
and transfer; and Part IV takes up the procedural aspects of securing
exemption, including the troublesome problem of jurisdiction. 6
ORIGIN AND PURPOSE
Great though our debt is to the common law, the homestead and the
extensive body of law that has developed around it are distinctly American.
Although the so-called homestead tax exemption as applied to a portion
of the assessed valuation of realty is nothing more than a mere residence
exclusion, 7 having no legal connection with family headship and confined
to only a few states,8 the true homestead exemption from forced sale is a
'For convenience the current homestead provisions of the Constitution of the State
of Florida are quoted in full at the end of Part III of this article, of which Parts I,
II and III are included in this issue. Parts IV and V will follow in the next issue.
Footnotes are numbered consecutively throughout the entire article, in the interests, of
clarity and consistency.
'For the term "residence exclusion" the authors are indebted to a former student,
Louis W. Wallace, now of the Tampa bar. The tabulation of the laws of other states
has been made possible by the research of Mandell Glicksberg, Irvin P. Golden and
Mallory E. Home, of the research staff of U. or FLA. L. Rv.
'Less than one fourth of the states, including Florida, permit this exemption; one
of these limits it to veterans, while two confine it to state taxes only. Discussion
appears in Part V infra.
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fundamental part of the law in all but four states and the District of Co-
lumbia.9 In Florida it was introduced in 1868 and has remained with us
ever since. 10 The Florida provisions are worded in a manner all their
own, and for this reason judicial constructions in other jurisdictions are not
of great assistance;:" but in any event a sizable body of Florida statutory
and judicial material exists today, supplementing and expounding Article X
of our Constitution.
The basic philosophy underlying the exemptions of both homestead
realty and homestead personalty from forced sale, and the canons of
construction governing interpretation of its constitutional and statutory
formulation, were early and well set forth. In the words of Mr. Chief
Justice Browne:
12
"Their obvious purpose is to secure to each family a home and
means of livelihood, irrespective of financial misfortune, and beyond
the reach of creditors; security of the State from the burden of pau-
'Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island allow no exemption of the
homestead from forced sale. Indiana, like Florida, provides an exclusion for resident
householders, but the amount is $700 only. Of the states authorizing this exemption,
over half limit it to $2,500 or less. Florida has no valuation limit on property so
exempted.
"The so-called exemption actually comprises several exemptions. The original
protection against forced sale was embodied in the three sections of Article IX of the
Florida Constitution of 1868. In the Constitution of 1885, adopted by the Conven-
tion held in that year and effective January 1, 1887, these provisions were perpetuated,
as well as expanded in some respects, in the then six sections of Article X, which is the
organic law of today. The 1868 Section 2, which created an additional exemption of
$1,000 in any of his property that the head of a family residing in Florida might
select, was dropped. The new Section 2 stated that the exemptions in Section 1
should "inure to the widow and heirs," in lieu of the 1868 provision that these should
merely "accrue to the heirs. .. ."
On November 6, 1934, the basis of Section 7 of Article X, establishing what is
generally known as the homestead tax exemption, was added by amendment; and in
1938, by further amendment, Section 7 in its present form was adopted, the exemp-
tion to apply "for the year 1939 and thereafter." The statutory material supplement-
ing the organic law of homesteads is collected chiefly in FLA. STAT., cc. 222 (method of
setting apart), 731 (descent), 192, 200 (tax) (1941), as amended and brought up to
date periodically.
"This was recognized in the early days of Florida homestead law. See, e.g., Smith
v. Guckenheimer & Sons, 42 Fla. 1, 12, 36, 27 So. 900, 914, 911 (1900) ; McDougall v.
Meginniss, 21 Fla. 362, 369-372 (1885).
"'West Florida Grocery Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 229, 77 So. 209,
212 (1917), quoting Hines v. Duncan, 79 Ala. 112, 114-115 (1885).
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perism, and of the individual citizen from destitution. Such statutes
are entitled to a liberal construction ...."
Again, as Mr. Chief Justice Buford aptly phrased it:' s
"The purpose of the exemption laws is to prevent the unfortunate
citizen, from being deprived of the necessaries of life and to preserve
for him and his family certain things reasonably necessary to enable
him to earn a livelihood and where his livelihood is produced by his
personal labor and services to so protect him and his family that such
earnings may not be taken from them and they be left destitute and
a charge upon charity."
Mr. Chief Justice Randall, speaking of similar provisions in the Con-
stitution of 1868, said: 14
"The object of exemption laws is to protect people of limited means
and their families in the enjoyment of so much property as may be
necessary to prevent absolute pauperism and want, and against the
consequence of ill advised promises which their lack of judgment and
discretion may have led them t( make, or which they may have been
induced to enter into by the persuasion of others."
He distinguished as follows the lien of a mortgage upon specified
property from a blanket waiver: 1 5
"Few men would mortgage their household goods and their chil-
dren's clothes to a hard creditor with the inevitable result brought
vividly to their understanding, but many thoughtless and improvi-
dent people might be induced to obtain credit by merely 'waiving the
benefit of exemption,' and thus placing the last blanket and bed and
their own and the children's clothing at the mercy of a hard creditor,
if an agreement like this should be sustained."
A further caveat was succintly expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Whit-
field in Milton v. Milton:16
"Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 102 Fla. 603, 606, 136 So. 353, 355 (1931).
"1Carters Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 569 (1884); cf. Patterson v. Taylor, 15
Fla. 336, 345-347 (1875).
"Carters Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 570 (1884).
1"63 FIa. 533, 536, 38 So. 718, 719 (1912).
4
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"Organic and statutory provisions relating to homestead exemp-
tions should be liberally construed in the interest of the family home.
But the law should not be so applied as to make it an instrument of
fraud or imposition upon creditors."
A word of explanation is due at this point. The important factor, in
borderline situations involving either creation or abandonment of a home-
stead or debts possibly constituting exceptions to the exemption, is the
intent of the homesteader. In the eye of the law, acquisition of home-
stead status deprives a creditor of nothing; he is presumed to know what
the law authorizes, and should insist on a mortgage if in doubt as to the
reliability of his debtor.' 7 The mere existence of a strong motive, whether
it be the desire to obtain credit by holding out as non-homestead prop-
erty a lot that the debtor intends at the time to occupy later as his
residence, or the instinctive urge of a debtor to avoid levy by unsecured
creditors if possible,' 8 or the natural determination of an intending
alienor to avoid restraints arising by virtue of the homestead character
of his property, 19 is beside the mark provided there be shown of record
the overt acts and the intent requisite to the creation or continuance of a
home and a position as head of the family, or the contrary in the case of
the intending alienor.
Such a motive is material, however, in reaching a decision as to the
true intent of the claimant and the actual existence, at the precise time
involved, of those factors essential to the creation or continuance of a
homestead exemption, such as ownership of the property in question, resi-
dence thereon, headship of the family, a debt that is not within the classes
excepted from the protection against forced sale, and absence of any
equitable lien. This is amply demonstrated by an examination of what
the Supreme Court of Florida and the local federal courts have done in
'1 Heddon v. Jones, 115 Fla. 19, 154 So. 891 (1934); Rigby v. Middlebrooks, 102
Fla. 148, 135 So. 563 (1931) ; see Sneed v. Davis, 135 Fla. 271, 184 So. 865 (1938),
and opinions from other jurisdictions quoted with approval therein by a unanimous
court.
1 5Heddon v. Jones, 115 Fla. 19, 154 So. 891 (1934) (exemption upheld although
property was occupied to prevent attachment of judgment lien of creditor who had
been led to regard this land as possible asset in event of default) ; contrast Read v.
Leitner, 80 Fla. 574, 86 So. 425 (1920) (dubious claim to exemption sustained),
with Murphy v. Farquhar, 39 Fla. 350, 22 So. 681 (1897) (abandonment of home-
stead found as a fact, primarily because of attempted conveyance to wife as insulation
against creditors).
"0Menendez v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214. 143 So. 223 (1932).
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practice in close cases of various types; 20 in these is found the true sig-
nificance of the statement that the homestead provisions are not to be used
as a cloak for fraud and deceit.
A homestead is popularly conceived as a piece of realty or a slice of
personalty; but once this has been saidthe less the notion is pursued, the
better. In the first place, the homestead may be a mere interest in realty.
More important still, to the Florida resident-and therefore to his attor-
ney-the significant factor is the homestead exemption. This exemption
provides freedom from a particular type of legal process, or of taxation, or
of both, accorded to particular legal types of individuals, owning realty
within particular dimensions in particular localities or personalty within
a particular assessed valuation, or both, under particular sets of condi-
tions, at particular times, as regards particular kinds of debts, and with
mandatory provisions for descent of the exemption-not the property-to
particular dasses of persons. 2 1 To arrive at a meaning, or rather at the
several meanings, of the term homestead exemption, each of the above
components must be analyzed individually.
PART I-ExEUrTION or HOmESTEAD REALTY FROm FORCED SALE
The steps in ascertaining the existence of the homestead realty exemp-
tion 2 2 are these:
1. Is the obligation upon which the attempted forced sale is predicated
one that gives rise to any exemption?
2. If so, was the obligor the head of a family?
,0E.g., Croker v. Croker, 51 F.2d 11 (C. C. A. 5th 1931); In re David, 54 F.2d
140 (S. D. Fla. 1931); Parrish v. Robbirds, 146 Fla. 324, 200 So. 925 (1941); Bishop
v. First Old State Bank, 142 Fla. 190, 194 So. 488 (1940); LaMar v. Lechlider, 135
Fla. 703, 185 So. 833 (1939); First Nat. Bank of Chipley v. Peel, 107 Fla. 413, -145
So. 177 (1932); Bess v. Anderson, 102 Fla. 1127, 136 So. 898 (1931); Church v.
Leq, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931); Anderson Mill and Lumber Co. v. Clements,
101 Fla. 523, 134 So. 588 (1931); Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 106 So. 127
(1925); Semple v. Semple, 82 Fla. 138, 89 So. 638 (1921); Rawlins v. Dade Lumber
Co., 80 NFa. 398, 86 So. 334 (1920); Pawco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819, 75 So. 30 (1917);
C. 1. Witt Co. v. Moody, 72 Fla. 459, 73 So. 582 (1916); Florida Loan & Trust Co.
v. Crabb, 45 Fla. 306, 33 So. 523 (1903) ; Drucker v. Rosenstein, 19 Fla. 191 (1882).
"Descent of the exemption and descent of the homestead realty itself have been
confused in several of the opinions; see Part Ir, 3 infra.
"'Throughout Parts I and II the term "exemption," unless otherwise specifically
stated, is confined to the exemption from forced sale of homestead realty. In Part
III it is limited to the exemption from forced sale of homestead personalty.
6
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3. Did he reside in Florida on the property claimed as exempt?
4. Did he own any estate in such property?
5. Were these factors all in existence at the material time, and what is
the physical extent of the property to which the exemption applies?
1. The Underlying Obligation
This problem is posed first, because if the underlying obligation be
such that it does not fall within the exemption, the final decision can be
reached immediately; forced sale is not forbidden. Article X, Section 1,
of the Florida Constitution provides:
".. . no property shall be exempt from sale for taxes or assess-
ments or for the erection or repair of improvements on the real estate
exempted, or for house, field or other labor performed on the same."
Taxes and Assessments. The matter of taxes and assessments offers
little difficulty, inasmuch as the term "taxes" here embraces any tax
validly levied and does not contemplate the problem of what can be taxed
and to what extent. The wording of Section 1 of Article X raises a
doubt as to whether the taxes under consideration embrace all taxes or
merely those levied against the homestead property itself. The question
was left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Florida Industrial Commis-
sion v. Coleman,23 although the chancellor took the latter position below.
In any event, Section 1 is in no way modified by Section 7, which, broadly
speaking, excludes from all "taxation," other than assessments for special
benefits, a certain amount of the assessed valuation of the realty owned and
used as a home by any Florida resident, even though he or she resides alone.
Nor is it affected by the exclusion of $500 of personalty from the taxable
base of the head of a family residing in Florida.2 4 Whenever these limits
are passed, the excess is subject to taxation; and forced sale of the home-
stead will follow unless such tax be paid. Assessments for special benefits
apply to homestead and privately owned non-homestead property alike,
and forced sale can always be used to collect them.
Purchase Obligations. The exception of purchase obligations is not so
clear. While its basis is the obviously fair principle that one cannot, in
"'154 Fla. 744, 18 So.2d 905 (1944). That chancellor is now Mr. Justice Barns.
The decree involved personalty and was affirmed on appeal, though on statutory
grounds. The cogent reasoning in the decree, which is quoted in the opinion, is be-
lieved to express the sound view.
"'FLA. CONST. Art. IX, §11.
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the very acquisition of the homestead, secure it in practical effect free
from liability for payment, the removal of this type of obligation from the
exempted class is strictly construed against the creditor.2 5 Purchase-money
means money directly used in purchasing, and does not extend to refi-
nancing operations after purchase. This issue arose specificaly in Wihelhm
v. Locklar,2 6 in which the homesteader borrowed cash from a friend, giv-
ing his unsecured note in return, and used the cash to pay off at a discount
a note originally delivered to cover a part of the purchase price of his home-
stead. The Supreme Court refused to allow execution against the home-
stead on the second note, although conceding that payment of the first note
could have been so enforced. The following statement of principle was
quoted with approval from Lewton v. Hower,2 7 in which a general com-
mingled claim "for work and labor and money expended" in improving the
homestead land was denied enforcement by levy thereon:
"An indebtedness for money borrowed to purchase materials, or to
pay for labor bestowed in improving lands, or money expended in the
purchase of such materials, or in payment for such labor, is not an
obligation contracted 'for the erection of improvements,' nor an oblig-
ation contracted for such labor, and is not within the exceptions of the
constitutional provisions. The contract in such case is to repay money
loaned or expended, and not a contract to pay for the erection of im-
provements, or for labor on the' premises.
"The purpose of the exception of 'obligations contracted for the
erection of improvements' and for 'labor performed on the same,' so
that a homestead is liable for such debts, though not for debts gen-
erally, is that those who have furnished the materials and performed
the labor may have their remedy upon the property they have in part
created and enhanced by the bestowal of their labor and property, and
in the absence of any provision giving the lender of moneys, which
have been expended upon the property, the benefit of the exception,
the courts are powerless to extend it to them."
The purchase money, once advanced, need not be used immediately,
however. An elderly woman advanced funds to a young Polish immigrant
in New York over a period of years, and also served as his housekeeper,
"'Se Citizens State Bank v. Jones, 100 Fla. 1492, 1495, 131 So. 369, 371 (1930),
and cases there cited.
"46 Fla. 575, 35 So. 6 (1903).
"718 Fla. 872, 882 (1882).
8
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under an agreement that he would support her when she became too old
to work.2 8 They moved to Florida, where his business, a tourist camp
outside Tampa in which they both resided, was acquired with funds ob-
tained in substantial measure from her, and was maintained through their
joint efforts. He later acquired a young wife and an aversion to his el-
derly benefactor. The Court upheld an equitable lien on his rural home-
stead in the amount of purchase funds advanced and value of services
rendered by Mrs. Sonneman. The use of her funds in acquiring his home-
stead was "reasonably inferred from the testimony adduced .. . 29
The specific advances of cash occurred prior to the purchase of the tourist
camp, while the services were rendered both before and after this date.
These two sources of obligation, however, are placed together in the Florida
Constitution as exceptions not confronted with the barrier of homestead
exemption.
The obligation incurred in purchasing a homestead need not be based
on money alone. In Porter v. Teate30 the consideration given by Porter
in acquiring from Teate 400 acres in Florida was a conveyance to Teate of
certain Georgia lands, with full covenants. The title to the Georgia prop-
erty failed, and Teate obtained judgment in Florida against Porter for
breach of the covenants. When Teate bought Porter's 400 acres at
execution sale, Porter claimed that 160 acres were exempt as his home-
stead. The claim was summarily rejected, not only as regards Porter
but also as to the third party who had purchased this tract from him for
value but with notice. The decision is logical as well as fair; the con-
sideration agreed to as the purchase price was never furnished.
Labor. Obligations arising out of labor performed on the homestead,
or out of the erection of improvements on the real estate, or out of repairs
made to such improvements, present no serious problems. Indeed, the
dearth of cases on these points indicates that the law is well understood.
Payment for materials used in constructing or repairing improvements is of
course obligatory,3 1 as is payment for labor; but enforcement of repay-
"'Sonneman v. Tuszynski, 139 Fla. 824, 191 So. 18 (1939).
29
1d. at 830, 191 So. at 20.
"17? Fla. 813 (1880).
"1In Giddens v. Dickenson, 60 Fla. 320, 53 So. 929 (1910), a carpenter purchased
materials on credit, used these to construct a building, then claimed as against the
suppliers a homestead personalty exemption of $1,000 out of the money owed him by
the owner of the building. His claim was rejected on the purchase-money theory; his
$1,000 of personalty was in fact created by his obtaining and using the materials.
9
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ment of funds used for such payment runs afoul of the rule in Lewton v.
Hower.3 2
Nearly a quarter of a century ago, however, our Supreme Court
nipped in the bud any fond notion that it was gong to let this rule
get out of hand. The president of a corporation facing bankruptcy
fraudulently used over $500 of its cash to effect substantial repairs
to his house; and its trustee in bankruptcy, suing to recover this
sum, was met by the claim of homestead exemption. 33 This answer
was summarily brushed aside on the ground that this chicanery was
no mere contract of loan; as a matter of equity the corporation was
deemed to have furnished the materials and labor, in view of its
ignorance of the financial transaction.
Partnership Obligations. Our chameleon adopts a different hue
when he pauses in the partnership field. In a well-considered dic-
tum an early opinion established in Florida the principle that part-
nership assets cannot be claimed by an individual partner as his home-
stead property prior to dissolution.3 4 In a later case Joseph Platt
purchased the entire interest of his brother in their general merchan-
dising business, a co-partnership, in consideration of the payment of
$490 to his brother and the assumption of all of the partnership
liabilities. 3 5 Joseph paid the $490, but was unable to meet all the
liabilities. His brother thereupon requested a receiver of the stock
of merchandise remaining in Joseph's hands, as well as a declaration
subjecting these assets to liability for partnership debts. Joseph
claimed $1,000 of such assets as his homestead exemption. Final
decree in favor of his brother was affirmed on the ground that -the
assumption of the partnership liabilities was an integral part of the
purchase price of the brother's interest.
This reasoning applies a fortiori against the owner of the home in which the ma-
terials are used; e.g., Anderson Mi and Lumber Co. v. Clements, 101 Fla. 523, 134
So. 588 (1931); Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 106 So. 127 (1925). Mere chicken-
feed, insecticides, tonics and similar merchandise, however, furnished on credit to a
homesteader engaged in the poultry business, are not materials used in the erection
or repair of improvements, nor do they constitute labor. Lamb v. Ralston Purina
Co., 155 Fa. 638, 21 So.2d 127 (1945).
8218 La. 872 (1882), discussed at p. 19, supra.
"Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 106 So. 127 (1925).
'See Peck v. Bowden, 18 Fla. 17, 19-21 (1881).
Platt v. Platt, 50 Ba. 594, 39 So. 536 (1905). Although this case involves the
personalty exemption, the principle applies to the realty exemption as well.
10
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The same reasoning was applied more recently by a federal court in
meeting the same type of claim. 36 The partners had dissolved their part-
nership and partitioned its assets, the consideration from each being as-
sumption of his pro rata share of the liabilities. Each partner then raised
the bar of homestead exemption. The maneuver failed.
Lee v. Bradley Fertilizer Co., 3 7 in which exemption was accorded
assets of individuals obtained upon dissolution of their partnership dur-
ing its insolvency but before judgment against it, does not lessen the force
of the foregoing decisions. Counsel for plaintiff, the corporation, com-
mitted the tactical error of setting down the matter for hearing on his bill
and the amended answer without replication and short of the time allowed
for taking testimony, thereby admitting the Lee brothers' allegations of
dissolution in good faith based on delivery of valid consideration. The
maxim lex nemini operatur iniquum was applied, and both the partition
and the subsequent acquisition of homestead exemption were accordingly
upheld. The decision should not be construed, however, as authority for
any substantive rule condoning dissolution and distribution of partner-
ship assets in fraud of creditors.
Growing Crops. Shifting to a somewhat different setting, with our
chameleon sitting first on a cotton boll 3 s and then on a grapefruit 3 9
grown by a tenant, still another concept appears. Growing crops, whether
regarded as fructuts naturales or fructus industriales, are a part of the
realty unless expressly reserved as between the parties, and accordingly
z.annot be claimed by the tenant against his landlord as exempt homestead
property.
Prior Liens. Once again, our chameleon seems to scamper off-in any
event, he cannot be found-when confronted with the prior lien of a validly
executed mortgage of either specific realty or specific personalty, or with
the prior lien of a judgment at law or a decree in equity, or with a statu-
"In re David, 54 F.2d 140 (S. D. Fla. 1931).
"'44 Fla. 787, 33 So. 456 (1902).
"Hodges v. Cooksey, 33 Fla. 715, 15 So. 549 (1894); Cathcart v. Turner, 18 Fla.
837 (1882) (both cases relating to levy by creditors).
"0Adams v. Adams, 158 Fla. 173, 28 So.2d 254 (1946). Fruit on the tree was
declared homestead realty for purpose of descent. The opinion limited Gentile Bros.,
Inc. v. Bryan, 101 Fla. 233, 133 So. 630 (1931), strictly to the decision that home-
stead fruit, as distinct from the trees, can be mortgaged by the husband alone as
personalty to secure payment for fertilizer, spray and insecticides furnished to produce
and protect it.
11
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tory lien attaching in spite of the protection of the homestead exemption.
Analysis of these matters is pursued in connection with the problem of the
material time and also in the discussion of personalty.40 As will be shown,
the chameleon does not really run away; there was nothing that he could
crawl upon in the first place.
Homesteader-Debtor. Finally, a general word of caution regarding the
debt itself does not come amiss. Our chameleon always perches on a prop-
erty interest, but his parents are a homesteader and a debt. Neither alone
can give birth to him. To ascertain who owes the debt is just as important
as to decide who owns the property. It is basic that the debtor must be a
homesteader; otherwise no exemption can possibly arise. This rule causes
no confusion during the homesteader's life, because at this stage the ele-
mentary principle that the property of one person is not subject to execu-
tion in discharging the debt of another is easily applied.
When the homesteader dies and the exemption inures to his widow,
however, the picture sometimes becomes blurred. Assuming no lineal de-
scendants, the entire homestead property passes to her under the law of
descent;41 and the exemption still clings to it as regards the debts of her
husband, 4 2 even though he is no longer in existence. But this exemption
does not embrace her debts. 43 The property that constituted his home-
stead is now hers, with the chameleon resting permanently on it; but it is
not necessarily her homestead. To free it from subjection to forced sale
for her debts a new and different chameleon must be created for her, albeit
as to the same property, by her becoming in turn the head of a family
residing in Florida.4 4 The question asked about him at the moment he
"See Part I, 5 infra and Part IM infra.
'"F.A. STAT. §731.27, 731.23 (Cum. Supp. 1947), discussed in Part H infra. For
a clear analysis of the principle that homestead property passes pursuant to the stat-
utes governing descent and does not constitute a separate estate created by Article X
of the Florida Constitution, see the classic opinion of Taylor, C. J., in Hinson v.
Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687 (1897), recently cited as the controlling authority in
Nesmith v. Nesmith, 155 Fla. 823, 21 So.2d 789 (1945).
'FA. CoNsT. Art. X. §2, Raulerson v. Peeples, 77 Fla. 207, 81 So. 271 (1919).
"See, e.g., the opinion of Whitfield, J., on rehearing in SeashoIe v. O'Shields, 139
Fla. 839, 844, 191 So. 74, 76 (1939).
"E.g., Cowdery v. Herring, 106 Fla. 567, 143 So. 433 (1932); cf. DeCottes v.
Clarkson, 43 Fla. 1, 29 So. 442 (1901), applying the same reasoning to the prob-
lem of devise and descent; see Menendez v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 222, 143 So.
223, 226 (1932). A sound analysis of the underlying theory by Brown, J., appears in
Moore v. Price, 98 Fa. 276, 285, 123 So. 768, 771 (1929).
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dies must accordingly be asked again about her as regards her debts. If
she later dies as the head of a family the principles of analysis remain
the same, but the ultimate result to children receiving his property and
hers may be several chameleons at once.
4 5
2. The Head of a Family
Much of the homestead litigation has centered on the meaning of
family headship. The decisions, though numerous, disclose two basic
tests, which may be met together or in the alternative: (1) the legal duty
to maintain arising out of the family relationship at law, and (2) continu-
ing communal living by at least two individuals under such circumstances
that one is recognized as the person in charge. Stated broadly, there must
be a family at law, or a family in fact, or both.
In the normal situation of man and wife living together, with or with-
out children, the issue has proved too simple to provoke litigation.46
Conversely, divorce of husband from wife, with no dependents in the home,
obviously eliminates family headship, there being no family in fact or at
law. Even so, however, the inevitable close questions have at times arisen;
and the opinions dealing with them are worth analysis.
Mere physical separation of husband and wife by reason of age and
financial difficulties does not abolish the family relationship. A home-
steader, as he passed eighty, became too old and feeble to care for himself,
whereupon his younger and resourceful wife took boarders into his home
and paid a third party to care for him properly elsewhere. 4 7 The prin-
ciple involved in the decision, which reversed the dismissal of a bill pray-
ing that the executor under the old gentleman's will be enjoined from
taking possession of his home, is succinctly set forth in the following pas-
sage from the opinion of Mr. Justice Whitfield: a8
"The homestead was the means of support for both the husband
and the wife and the living apart was for mutual welfare, one remain-
ing on the homestead and supporting the other from earnings made on
and by the use of the homestead property, which was maintained as
"'A complicated example of shifting interests in property accompanied by changes
in family headship is ably analyzed by Ellis, J., in Hill v. First Nat. Bank of Mari-
at na, 73 Fla. 1092, 75 So. 614 (1917).
"Miller v. Finegan, 26 Fla. 29, 7 So. 140 (1890).
"'Nelson v. Hainlin, 89 Fla. 356, 104 So. 589 (1925).
dSId. at 359, 104 So. 590.
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a home on which the wife lived and to which the husband went as he
was disposed and able to do in his enfeebled condition during the last
few years of his life, there being amicable relations between the hus-
band and wife at all times."
One might assume that whenever the husband supports the wife on her
property the same reasoning applies. The situation is not analogous,
however, perhaps because sex rears its lovely head. Her separate prop-
erty is not his, of course, and accordingly it cannot be his homestead.4 9
But unless she supports the family he is the head; and the fact that the
home is on her property,5 0 or that he uses her property to support himself
and her,51 does not alter his status as the head of the family. In a case
directly in point,52 the wife had obtained the property from her father,
and her husband had no equitable interest in it; accordingly the claim of
homestead was rejected. The absence of any equitable interest on his part
in this type of case is important; if he purchases the property and gives
her the legal title, his equitable ownership provides a background on which
the homestead chameleon can rest.53
Nevertheless, a woman can be the head of a family for purposes of
law, provided the facts substantiate her claim. A widow with dependent
children, whether they be adults5 4 or minors, 55 and a wife supporting an
incapacitated husband, 56 are definitely in such a position. Furthermore,
a widower who rears his granddaughter in his home at his own expense,
after her mother dies and her father moves away. from the grandfather's
home, is the head of a family, even though he never formally adopts her.5 7
"Nelson v. Franklin, 152 Fla. 694, 12 So.2d 771 (1943).
"'Jones v. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp., 138 Fla. 65, 188 So. 804 (1939). It is
obvious that the rather significant word 'not" has been erroneously omitted in print-
ing line 1 of 138 Fla. at 67 and line 13 of 188 So. at 805.
'C. B. Witt Co. v. Moody, 72 Fla. 459, 73 So. 582 (1916).
"lSee note 49 supra.
"Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 27 So.2d 832 (1946).
54Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. "889, 13 So.2d 448 (1943); Davis v.
Miami Beach Bank & Trust Co., 99 Fla. 1282, 128 So. 817 (1930); Caro v. Caro,
45 Fla. 203, 34 So. 309 (1903).
"5jetton Lumber Co. v. Hall, 67 Fla. 61, 64 So. 440 (1914); cf. Matthews v. Jeacle.
61 Fla. 686, 55 So. 865 (1911); see Jones v. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp., 138 Fla. 65,
66, 188 So. 804, 805 (1939).
"'Bigelow v. Dunphe, 143 Fla. 603, 197 So. 328, rehearing denied, 144 Fla. 330,
198 So. 13 (1940).
"TAdams v. Clark, 48 Fla. 205, 37 So. 734 (194).
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The same result follows as regards a grandmother supporting her grand-
children in her home.5 8 Indeed, even a single man supporting his mother
and the children of a deceased sister in his home is the head of the
family.59
Still greater complications have arisen in connection with alleged
families consisting of one elderly parent and an adult child living in the
parent's home. Again, the influence of sex has left its mark. In DeCottes
v. Clarkson,60 early in the development of Florida homestead law, it was
settled that factual dependency is not the sole legal test of family head-
ship, that children living at home need not be minors or invalids to sus-
tain a claim of headship on the part of their parent, and that a healthy
adult female could be a dependent of her elderly mother even though she
rendered substantial service in the household. Promptly thereafter this
reasoning was slightly extended to uphold the family headship claim of
Mrs. Caro,6 ' two of whose daughters, Georgia and Florida, acted as nurse,
housekeeper and business manager, and earned all except their board by
taking in sewing. Both were of age. But they lived in her home and ac-
cordingly were members of her family.
Whidden v. Abbott 6 2 raised a similar issue as regards a son, an im-
poverished preacher of the gospel with a wife and four children. Upon the
death of his mother he returned to live with his father in the family home
after an absence of seventeen years. Although he testified that he con-
sidered his father the head of the family, the Supreme Court found a
mere "arrangement for the mutual benefit of all parties concerned"; 63 the
father's claim of homestead was rejected. Within a few months this prin-
ciple was applied in Dania Bank v. Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Co.6 4 The
allegation of the father that he ran the business in which he and his son
were engaged, as distinct from the home, was quite properly brushed aside
as immaterial. The Supreme Court, in directing reversal of a decree
exempting the alleged homestead from levy, emphasized the lack of "clear
and convincing evidence" that the son had "abdicated the position as head
of the family which the law cast upon him," 6 5 even though all of the in-
dividuals concerned lived in his father's home.
"Hill v. First Nat. Bank of Marianna, 73 Fla. 1092, 75 So. 614 (1917).
50lbid.
'043 Fla. 1, 29 So. 442 (1901).
"1Caro v. Caro, 45 Fla. 203, 34 So. 309 (1903).
02124 Fla. 293, 168 So. 253 (1936).
"Ild. at 295, 168 So. at 254.
06127 Fla. 45, 172 So. 476 (1937).
"5Id. at 52, 172 So. at 480.
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Some two years later, however, the opposite conclusion was reached
in Cumberland & Liberty Mills v. Keggin.66 The vital distinction was
said to lie in the fact that the son brought his wife to his father's home,
in which he was already living when he married her, and in which they both
remained until the father's death. This time the emphasis was placed on
"the absence of a showing that the father and the married son did not
regard the son and his family, while they lived on the father's homestead
with him, as being of the family of the father .... ,,67
The lines of reasoning in the Dania Bank and Cumberland cases are
difficult to reconcile. Mere continuity of residence with the father is in-
deed a slender reed.6 8 The gist of the problem in every instance is not
whether the owner of the property was formerly the head of a family, or
whether he may perhaps become one later, but simpiy whether he is the
head of a family at the time a lien attaches, or upon his death, as the case
may be. In the Dania Bank case, the son's headship of his own family
was presumed in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary. Yet in
the Cumberland case the presumption was just the opposite. With the
authorities in this unhappy state, the principle of law applicable in bor-
derline cases involving a determination of headship as between an adult
male child, as distinct from a female, and an elderly parent, is anybody's
guess. In its other aspects, however, the law as to headship is reason-
ably clear.
One further case should be mentioned in this connection. 6 9 A duti-
ful son acquired title to certain property while judgments were outstand-
ing against him, after having supported his dependent parents on a sep-
arate parcel of property for several years. Subsequently he married. His
claim of homestead was denied by a divided court. Although one may
feel reluctant to approve the decision, it does follow the law. His marriage
could not operate to defeat an existing lien. The obligation to support
his parents was moral, not legal. And since he did not live with them,
there was no family in fact.
"139 Fla. 133, 190 So. 492 (1939).8 1Id. at 136, 190 So. at 493.
"The absence of any evidence pointing to abandonment of his position as head
of his own family by a son returning to live with and care for his aged and infirm
mother, upon the death of her husband, was mentioned in Shambow v. Shambow,
153 Fla. 760, 15 So.2d 836 (1943) ; the facts obviously warranted the chancellor's find-
ing that the mother was not the family head. Probably it is significant that this
case involved a son rather than a daughter.
"Morehead v. Yongue, 134 Fla. 135, 183 So. 804 (1938) (two justices dissent-
ing).
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The problem of dispersal of the family is but another aspect of the
preceding discussion. The principle in itself is simple: no family, no head.
That there once was a family is immaterial. The homestead provisions
are designed to protect the family, not the aged. Regardless of how harsh
the policy may seem,. the law insists that an elderly parent, when left
alone at the end of his span, is no longer entitled to the homestead ex-
emption. Perhaps filial affection may effectively counteract the callous
philosophy that an aged parent has served his purpose and is expendable,
but the homestead provisions are of no assistance on this score. The
issue was clearly raised and settled with finality at the turn of the century
in Herrin v. Brown.
70
Legal separation of husband and wife, either when childless or after
departure of their children to establish homes of their own, destroys the
family.7 ' A question that might at first blush appear difficult is presented
by divorce resulting in award of custody of the minor child to the mother.
The family is dispersed in fact, yet the father nevertheless remains under
a duty at law to support the child. The matter has been unanimously
and logically decided; the father is still the head of the family for home-
stead purposes.
72
In instances of desertion the line is a thin one, but it has nonetheless
been ably drawn. The husband retains his family headship even though
the wife leaves him for reasons of cruelty and with her small daughter
remains absent for ten years, provided she does not establish a domicile
elsewhere and is privileged to return home at will. 73 If, however, the
wife leaves her husband with an expressed intent not to return, removes
to another city with her belongings, and engages counsel to procure a
divorce, the family relationship is terminated in the absence of dependent
children, and she cannot claim his property under the law of homestead. 74
The Supreme Court noted the "dearth of evidence" in the record to sub-
7044 Fla. 782, 33 So. 522 (1902) (father left alone) ; accord, Matthews v. Jeacle, 61
Fla. 686, 55 So. 865 (1911) (mother left alone); Jordan v. Jordan, 100 Fla. 1586,
132 So. 466 (1931) (both left alone upon their separation after departure of adult
children).
'Miller v. West Palm Beach AUt. Nat. Bank, 142 Fla. 22, 194 So. 230 (1940);
Jordan v. Jordan, supra note 70. In the Miller case even a subsequent recondhia-
tion following several months of living apart was held not to abrogate an executed
contract, specifically a settlement by deed of property formerly homestead, executed
by the husband alone to his wife.
"2Osceola Fertilizer Co. v. Sauls, 98 Fla. 339, 123 So. 780 (1929).
"O'Neal v. Miller, 143 Fla. 171, 196 So. 478 (1940).
"Barlow v. Barlow, 156 Fla. 458, 23 So.2d 723 (1945).
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stantiate the "cruel treatment" alleged by her in this case. 7 5 Whether
the decision be based on her establishment of a separate domicile or on
reasoning similar to that which evoked the time-honored Statute of West-
minister 1176 penalizing an adulterous and deserting wife with loss of all
dower rights, the conclusion is not illogical and is obviously sound as a
matter of policy.
Desertion by the husband does not render his wife the head of a family
unless she supports dependents residing with her. 7 7 Does he remain the
head of the family, however? If he establishes his domicile outside Florida,
he is ipso facto no longer a resident, of course. And if he sets up his resi-
dence elsewhere within Florida, he cannot claim his former residence.
Furthermore, during whatever time he lives apart he has no family in fact.
The duty to support any children he may have remains, nevertheless, and
so does his duty to maintain his wife until the chancellor decides other-
wise. On principle, and by analogy to Osceola Fertilizer Co. v. Sauls,
7 s
he should be regarded as the head of the family if he in fact contributes
to the support of any of its other members.
As a matter of strict logic the same reasoning would leave him as the
head on the basis of legal duty alone; but, as a means of furthering the
protection of the family from destitution by granting exemption, the in-
ducement to contribute after desertion must be weighed against the whole-
some deterring effect of realization on the part of a husband toying with
such an idea that the chameleon rides in his pocket and disappears when
he does. Of course, when there are children and the wife is in fact forced
to support them, there is no valid reason why he should have an exemption
in addition to hers; and furthermore, there cannot be two heads at any
one time. 79 This rules out his exemption, it is stibmitted.
3. Residence in Florida on Property Claimed as Exempt
The mere establishment of family headship will not alone confer rights
of exemption. The claimant must have a permanent residence, and it
"Id. at 460, 23 So.2d at 724.
7"13 EDW. I, c. 34 (1285); cf. F.A. STAT. §65.08 (Cum. Supp. 1947), proscribing
alimony award to adulterous wife, Malby v. Malby, 142 Fla. 656, 195 So. 601 (1940).
"Contrast In re Hallbauer, 280 Fed. 118 (S. D. Fla. 1921) (no children) with
Jetton Lumber Co. v. Hall, 67 Fla. 61, 64 So. 440 (1914) (children left dependent
on deserted wife).
"See note 72 supra.
"See Johns v. Bowden, 68 Fla. 32, 45, 66 So. 159, 159 (1914).
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1949], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol2/iss1/2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
must be in Florida.8 0 Elementary though this may sound, one must never
lose sight of the concept "home" in "homestead." What "home" con-
notes to the layman, the terms "domicile," "permanent residence" or
"principal residence" denote to the lawyer.
It is fundamental that an individual can have only one domicile, or
permanent residence, at any one time-at least for the same purpose within
the same jurisdictionSL--and accordingly a decision by the Florida
judiciary that his domicile is at one particular location automatically
forecloses every other as far as the law of Florida is concerned. This
determination is a conclusion of fact, and the relevant factors are those
considered in settling the issue of domicile for any other purpose. Citizen-
ship may well have some slight bearing on the matter, but it is by no
means conclusive.8 2 Nor is it prescribed by law.8 3
Whether the question be one of residence within or without the State
of Florida, or one of principal or permanent residence as between two or
more locations within Florida, the usual indicia such as the situs of the
claimant for purposes of taxation, his voting precinct, his physical pres-
ence during the major portion of the period involved, his formal declara-
tions and informal statements, the actual location of his family, his par-
ticipation in local politics, his club memberships, the situs of the major por-
tion of his belongings, his telephone and mailing address, and the location of
his business, his bank account and his safe deposit box, are all relevant.8 4
Assuming the permanent residence of the claimant to be Florida, what
of the phrase "head of a family residing in Florida"?8 5 Fortunately,
"FLA. CONST. Art. X, §1, Post v. Bird. ); see, e.g., Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.
811 BmEA, CoNrucr OP LAWS 123 (1935 Dorrance's Estate, 115 N. J. Eq. 268, 170
S. 619, 625 (1914) (per Holmes, J.); In re v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556, 561 (1873).
AtI. 601 (Prerog. Ct. 1934) passim; DupuyA. 5th 1931).
"Croker v. Croker, 51 F.2d 11 (C. C. in Florida as a prerequisite to homestead
"'Citizenship never has been prescribed ally included in the 1934 amendment creat-
exemption from forced sale. It was specificSteuart v. State ex rel. Dolcimascolo, 119
ing the realty tax exemption, Art. X, §7, 28 Fla. 1, 25, 9 So. 888, 894 (1891).
Fla. 117, 161 So. 378 (1935), but it was deleted in the current amendment adopted
in 1938.
8 On the question of the factors considered in establishing domicile, see the excel-
lent analyses by Hutcheson, Circ. J., in Croker v. Croker, 51 F.2d 11 (C. C. A.
5th 1931), and by Chapman, J., in Miller v. Nelson, 35 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1948), as
well as those in Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81 (1857), and In re Dorrance's Estate, 115
N. J. Eq. 268, 170 Atl. 601. (Prerog. Ct. 1934), afrd mein. sub nom. Dorrance v.
Martin, 13 N. J. Misc. 168, 176 Atl. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1935), 116 N. J. L. 362, 184 Atl.
743 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936), cert. denied,, 298 U. S. 678 (1936), rehearing denied, 298
U. S. 692 (1936).
"_FLA. CoNsT. Art. X, §1.
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although this expression is hardly a model of linguistic accuracy, confu-
sion can seldom arise as a practical matter. Normally the permanent
residence of a man's family is his residence, even though some or all of
his family may leave the home temporarily. The absence may be pro-
longed, but O'Neal v. MillersO demonstrates that if he is a Florida resi-
dent and the family relationship continues legally, then the homestead
requirements are met. Assume, however, that he resides outside Florida
and his family establishes a separate domicile here. Grammatically, there
is a "family residing in Florida," although its head is not a resident. It is
submitted that on principle he is not entitled to a homestead exemption as
regards his Florida property. If he resides permanently elsewhere, the
house here is not his "home"; either the permanent residence of the family
is his foreign domicile, or there are two separate domiciles, with the result
in either event that the husband himself is not the head of a family resid-
ing in Florida.
4. Ownership of the Estate in Question
Family headship and Florida residence do not alone establish exemp-
tion. The interest claimed as homestead must be owned by the claimant,
or in other words headship and ownership must be joined in one individual.
When the husband is the head and the property is his, no question arises.
The determination is equally simple when the wife supports him on her
property. If he is old enough, or clever enough, to induce -er to support
him on his property, he may still remain the head in the eye of the law; 8 7
but if he supports her on her property there can be no homestead exemp-
tion, because he is the head and yet she is the owner.8 8 The same rea-
soning applies as between parent and child.8 9 The problems involved in
partnerships have already been discussed.90
Since there can be only one head of a family, it follows as a corollary
that there can be only one homestead per family. It also follows that
there may on occasion be no homestead at all, as we have noted in the
preceding paragraph, even though a family does exist.
"141 Fla. 171, 196 So. 478 (1940).
"TSee note 47 supra.
"Nelson v. Franklin, IS2 Fla. 694, 12 So.2d 771 (1943); C. B. Witt Co. v.
Moody, 72 Fla. 459, 73 So. 582 (1916); see Semple v. Semple, 82 Fla. 138, 148,
89 So. 638, 641 (1921).
"See notes 69, 66, 68, 69 supra.
"See text suPra 0. 21.
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Property is, of course, the background on which our homestead chame-
leon lies, and accordingly the nature of the property interest is an impor-
tant consideration. The meaning of the term "homestead" connoted by
the words "to the extent of one hundred and sixty acres of land, or the
half of one acre within the limits of any incorporated city or town,
owned"91 is misleading without an analysis of the relevant decisions. The
mind of a lawyer naturally turns to fee simple when ownership of land is
mentioned. This is the wrong turn, however, in analyzing the homestead
exemption.
The "homestead" to which the exemption applies is an estate, and
this may be less than the fee simple. It may consist of the equitable or
beneficial ownership of the physical property,9 2 or an undivided one-half
interest, 93 or a one-fourth interest as coparcener, 9 4 or a one-third interest
as tenant in common, 9 5 or mere possession either as licensee 96 or without
objection on the part of the legal owner, 9 7 or the equity of redemption
that a deserted wife supporting minor children has in two encumbered
business automobiles abandoned by her absconding husband, an interest
in personalty that the Supreme Court found without describing.9 8 Mr.
Justice Terrell, speaking of realty, recently summarized the law in his
statement that "a homestead exemption extends to any right or interest
the head of a family may hold in land." 99
In addition to the foregoing interests in property, the law of Florida
furnishes a rather unusual perch for our chameleon in the form of an es-
"1F A. CoNST. Art. X, §1 (italics supplied).
*2Beall v. Pinckney, 150 F.2d 467 (C. C. A. 5th 1945); Bessemer Properties,
Inc. v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 27 So.2d 832 (1946).
"3Morgan v. Bailey, 90 Fla. 47, 105 So. 143 (1925).
"Milton v. Milton, 63 Fla. 533, 58 So. 718 (1912).
"Hill v. First Nat. Bank of Marianna, 73 Fla. 1092, 75 So. 614 (1917).
"Anderson Mill and Lumber Co. v. Clements, 101 Fla. 523, 134 So. 588 (1931).
FLA. STAT. §222.05 (1941) authorizes exemption of a house owned and occupied as
one's home though located on property not owned but merely lawfully possessed.
'Hill v. First Nat. Bank of Marianna, 73 Fla. 1092, 75 So. 614 (1917).
"Jetton Lumber Co. v. Hall, 67 Fla. 61, 64 So. 440 (1914) (precise type of interest
of wife doubtful in view of express refusal to base decision on title to automobile in
wife; with title in husband, her interest is limited to mere right of possession, since
she did not claim on basis of his family headship but rather on hers); see Pasco
v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819, 829, 75 So. 30, 34 (1917).
"Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 39, 27 So.2d 832, 833 (1946);
cf. Miller v. Finegan, 26 Fla. 29, 7 So. 140 (1890).
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tate by the entirety.10 0 Such property cannot be sold to pay the sep-
arate debts of either spouse while they are both living,10  nor does any
interest or right of the deceased spouse remain to be levied upon when
Z"On the nature in general of the Florida tenancy by the entirety see Note, 1 U.
or FIA. L. REv. 433 (1948), as well as the helpful summaries by Sibley, CirI. J., in
Sheldon v. Waters, 168 F.2d 483, 484 (C, C. A. 5th 1948), and by Whitfield, I., in
Newman v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 119 Fla. 641, 160 So. 745 (1935), and in
Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925). This latter case and Dodsan v.
National Title Ins. Co., 31 So.2d 402 (Fla. 1947), affirm the possibility of a tenancy
by the entirety in personalty as well as realty. Further concise analysis is found
in the opinion of Thomas, J., in Andrews v. Andrews, 155 Fla. 654, 21 So.2d 205
(1945), holding that a wife cannot acquire title in herself alone by purchasing, at
tax sale following delinquency, realty held by herself and husband as tenants by the
entirety. More specifically, FLA. STAT. §689.11 (Cum. Supp. 1947), authorizing eon-
veyance of real estate from either spouse direct to the other, cannot constitutionally
embrace homesteads because of FLA. CoNs!. Art. X, §4, Estep v. Herring, 154 Fla.
653, 18 So.2d 683 (1944); Jahn v. Purvis, 145 Fla. 354, 199 So. 340 (1940).
The interest of the husband in non-homestead property held by the entireties
can be released to his wife, however, for the reasons ably set forth by Buford, J., in
Hunt v. Covington, 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941). Divorce automatically renders
the two spouses tenants in common, FLA. STAT. §689.15 (1941), Markland v. Mark-
land, 15$ Fla. 629, 21 So.2d 145. (1945), follwing Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23,
3 So.2d 727 (1941) ; therefore a deed from husband to wife of his interest in entirety
property is valid if placed in escrow and not delivered until after grant of divorce,
at which time he is a mere tenant in common; and, even though they have minor
children at the time, such a deed may properly embrace the former family home,
as Weigel v. Wiener, 149 Fla. 231, 5 So.2d 447 (1947), holds; accord, Moore v.
Hunter, 153 Fla. 158, 13 So.2d 909 (1943) (homestead owned by man alone and con-
veyed to ex-wife though he had lineal descendants).
Can a wife release her interest in homestead entirety property to her husband
prior to divorce, provided he is the family head? With no lineal descendants, no
one else has any interest in the matter until both spouses die. Assuming lineal
descendants, however, he as family head still cannot alienate without her joinder;
and as a practical matter expectancies by survivorship, previously impossible,
are created in these descendants upon vesting of the whole homestead property inter-
est in him alone. From a strictly legalistic standpoint, she cannot be the head while
he is; and what she releases vests in her husband ag an incidence of the original title.
It is not homestead property; rather it is her non-homestead share of the usufruct
of what is homestead property by virtue of his interest therein. For a related
analysis see the opinion of Whitfield, C. J., in Newman v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 119 Fla. 641, 648, 160 So. 745, 748 (1935).
1 0'Richardson v. Grill, 138 Fla. 787, 190 So. 255 (1939); Ohio Butterine CQ. v.
Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920).
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he or she dies.' 0 2 Up to this point there is no need for the protection of
the homestead exemption. A joint debt, however, can be collected by
levying on property held by the two as tenants by the entirety,'0o and
in such instances the homestead exemption becomes vital.
To be sure, the incidence of survivorship in joint tenancies exists today
in Florida, if, and only if, provided for expressly in the instrument creating
the estate;' 0 4 but in the venerable common-law fusion of two physical
persons into one legal person known as a tenancy by the entirety the
whole title continues in the remaining spouse as an incidence of the origi-
nal title.10o The essence of this estate is ownership per tout et non per
my; in other words, neither the husband nor the wife owns the property,
but rather a single legal person consisting of both husband and wife is the
owner.' 0 0 At the same time, it is obvious that this legal unit cannot be
the head of a family, nor can both the husband and the wife, if regarded
as two distinct persons, be the head at any one time. Logically, there-
fore, it might be argued that the true owner of the property as a matter
of law cannot be the head of a family, and that accordingly there can be
no homestead exemption.
Our Supreme Court met this cerebral legerdemain in sound practical
fashion. To accept such a contention would deny the homestead exemp-
tion to all families cursed with an estate by the entirety. On the other
hand, to deny to the surviving spouse title to the whole homestead estate
held at the death of the other spouse by the two spouses as tenants by the
entirety would crack a pillar of Florida property law. Our bench has
accordingly established two definite principles: the surviving spouse takes
all upon the death of the other, 10 7 but the exemption from forced sale
"02See, e.g., Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, supra note 101; English v. English,
66 Fla. 427, 431, 63 So. 822, 823 (1913).10°E.g., Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843 (1936).
10 FLA. STAT. §689.15 (1941); see Kozacik v. Kozacik, 157 Fla. 597, 601, 26 Sold
659, 661 (1946).
"'E.g., Palm Beach Estates v. Croker, 106 Fla. 617, 632, 143 So. 792, 797 (1932).
At times language will be found implying that the interest of the deceased spouse in
tenancies by the entirety passes by survivorship; see, e.g., Coleman v. Wflliams, 146
Fla. 45, 47, 200 So. 207, 208 (1941). In a physical sense this is true; the fact that
one spouse dies and the other survives results in full title in the survivor. But such
phraseology is misleading to a lawyer. In a legal sense the resultant full title is
not produced by survivorship, but rather as an incidence of the original title in
this unique type of estate.
..'See note 100 supra.
"O'Knapp v. Fredricksen, 148 Fla. 311, 4 So.2d 251 (1941); Coleman v. Williams,
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attaches as a shield by virtue of the property interest of the spouse serv-
ing as head of the family during. his or her life.10 8 This result is not
merely practical; it is also logical, once one admits that the protected
homestead interest need not be so extensive as sole ownership in fee.
To go a step further in analysis, when the head of the family dies, an
estate held by the two spouses as tenants by the entirety remains free from
liability for the debts of the decedent, not because his exemption passes
but rather because property of another, namely, the surviving spouse, can-
not be sold to pay his separate debts. Similarly, from the standpoint of
descent, the survivor takes the entire estate immediately and automatically
by operation of law, and the heirs do not acquire any interest or ex-
pectancy to which an exemption can attach.
5. The Material Time and the Physical Extent
Time may or may not be of the essence in contracts, but it is always
of the essence in the matter of homestead exemptions. Catch phrases such
as "once a homestead, always a homestead" are best forgotten; they con-
stitute the exception rather than the rule.
Attachment of Lien. Subject to the specifically favored classes of obli-
gations previously detailed,109 which are always protected by the remedy
of forced sale, unsecured debts are not recoverable by levy on the home-
stead. Neither are secured debts in many instances. The material time
is that of attachment of lien: if the lien precedes the establishment of the
homestead, forced sale is permitted; if the establishment of the homestead
is prior and the homestead status has not ceased by the time the lien at-
taches, then forced sale is barred.V O
Although detailed discussion of attachment and enforcement of liens
in general is beyond the scope of this article, a judgment at law or a
4146 Fla. 45, 200 So. 207 (1941); Menendez v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223
(1932). The dictum, purporting to summarize the Menendez holding, appearing in
the Knapp opinion at 148 Fla. 315, 4 So.2d 252, to the effect that "the homestead
status continued to exist and inure to the surviving wife," Is not only a patent
misstatement of the decision and opinions but is contrary to the basic characteristic
of an estate by the entirety.
'"Harkins v. Holt, 124 Fla. 774, 778, 169 So. 481, 482 (1936) (decision on cross-
assignment of error by appelee).
"'See Part I, 1 surs.
'"Contrast, e.g., Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819j 75 So. 30 (1917) (lien did attach)
with Milton v. Milton, 63 FIa.533, S8 So. 718 (1912) (lien did not attach).
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decree in equity rendered on or after June 5, 1939, does not in itself cre-
ate a lien; the lien attaches upon recordation and extends to all land of
the judgment debtor in each county in which the judgment is recorded.",
Judgments or decrees of Florida circuit courts rendered prior to this date,
however, became upon their mere entry a lien on all property located within
the county in which such judgment was rendered, 112 and elsewhere by
recordation. This applies to judgments of federal courts as well as to those
rendered by Florida courts. 113 A creditor's bill in chancery, when prop-
erly used as an ancillary remedial measure to reach equitable interests in
conjunction with an action at law already instituted,114 is useful in that
the lien attaches as of the date of filing the bill.115 Attachment is also
helpful; the lien dates from the attachment. 11 6
Judgments or decrees obtained merely to enforce liens based on con-
tract or mortgage, however, are not limited by the provisions of the re-
cordation statute; it was enacted to govern solely the establishment of
liens, as distinct from judicial enforcement of those already in existence.
117
Seventy-five years ago decrees authorizing foreclosure by mortgagees were
directed on appeal both as to personalty and later as to realty 18 on the
"'
1
FLA. STAT. §§55.10, 28.21(11) (1941); cf. Giddens v. McFarlan, 152 Fla. 281,
10 So.2d 807 (1943). The judgment lien does not, however, extend to property un-
related to the liability and to which the debtor holds mere legal title while a third
party not estopped is the beneficial owner. Michaels v. Albert Pick & Co., 158 Fla.
877, 30 So.2d 498 (1947).
.2 FLA. STAT. §55.08 (1941).




FLA. STAT. §62.37 (1941) ; cf. the succinct analyses of a creditor's bill in Florida
by Strum, J., In re Porter, 3 F. Supp. 582 (S. D. Fla. 1933), by Brown, J., in Riesen
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 153 Fla. 205, 14 So.2d 197 (1943), and by Davis, J., in
B. L. E. Realty Corp. v. Mary Williams Co., 101 Fla. 254, 134 So. 47 (1931).
.. Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 27 So.2d 832 (1946); Second
Nat. Bank of Washington v. Richter, 110 Fla. 237, 148 So. 517 (1933); First Nat.
Bank of Chipley v. Peel, 107 Fla. 413, 145 So. 177 (1933).
...See Heddon v. Jones, 115 Fla. 19, 20, 21, 154 So. 891, 892 (1934) ; Cf. FLA. STAT.,
c. 76 (1941), re attachment generally.
"'Nassau Realty Co. v. Jacksonville, 144 Fla. 754, 198 So. 581 (1940). For a
dear-cut delineation of the distinctions between judgment liens and mortgage liens
see the discussion by Thomas J., in Gilpen v. Bower, 152 Fla. 733, 735, 12 So.2d
884, 885 (1943). The problems raised by these liens when the debtor dies are dis-
cussed in Wilson and McGehee, Probate Claims in Florida, 1 U. or FLA. L. REv.
1, 8-11 (1948).
'Patterson v. Taylor, 15 Fla. 336 (1875) (personalty); Hart v. Sanderson's
Adm'rs, 18 Fla. 103 (1881) (realty).
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ground that this did not constitute a "forced sale" proscribed by the 1868
homestead article;" 9 and this principle of law has never been seriously
questioned by the courts since then. The date of attachment of the mort-
gage lien, and not the date of foreclosure, is the material time.
Establishment of Homestead Status. This date of lien does not of itself
solve the problem, however; it must be checked against the date of cre-
ation of homestead status. This latter involves two things: assumption
of headslip of a family, and acquisition of an estate. Neither is sufficient
by itself. The gay bachelor or allegedly morose spinster without de-
pendents, and the plodding family man without a home, must all pay their
debts.
Furthermore, the mere presence of these two prerequisites at some one
time is not conclusive. They must exist at that precise moment when the
exemption is alleged to apply. In short, one or more of the characteristics
essential to the existence of a homestead may have appeared and van-
ished. As has been noted previously, the homesteader may have ceased to
be the head of a family, or he may have moved to a location outside
Florida, or his interest in an estate by the entirety may have been termi-
rnated by his death. 2 0
Physcal Abandonment. The foregoing factors are not the only ones
to be considered. A homestead can be physically abandoned. In the sim-
plest instance, a man owning two separate pieces of property in Florida
may move from one to the other. Obviously he cannot have two homes,
in the required sense of permanent residence, at the same time in the same
jurisdiction. In establishing the second residence he loses the first. He
may do precisely this unwittingly.
One Farquhar and his wife acquired a parcel of country land, onto
which he moved with his wife; and within a few months he attempted to
convey it to her by deed from him alone.1 2 1 After residing there for three
years he joined her in conducting a grocery business in a two-story build-
ing owned by her separately and located some two and a half miles away.
Throughout the ensuing five years they lived in furnished rooms above the
store, although they visited the other property frequently on week-ends,
taking their provisions with them. The evidence was found to establish
the inference that these visits "were of about the same frequency and
'Fr CoNsT. Art. IX, §1 (1868), carried over in 1885 as FLA. CoNST. Art. X, §1.
'"See pp. 24 et seq., 29 et seq., and 32 et seq., supra.
'Murphy v. Farquhar, 39 Fla. 350, 22 So. 681 (1897).
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character as any one would ordinarily make for the purpose simply of look-
ing after" such property. 122  The Farquhars furnished the store property
as a home, and even took in boarders. Meanwhile the community in which
the store was located was incorporated as the town of Tarpon Springs.
Farquhar participated in organizing the municipality, voted as a resident,
and served as town marshal.
The country lot was sold to satisfy a judgment, and the Farquhars
filed a bill requesting that the deed be set aside and their homestead rights
upheld. In directing dismissal of the bill the Supreme Court stressed two
facts prompting reversal of the decree below: the- attempt to convey the
property to Mrs. Farquhar, indicating an opinion by her husband that the
property would in fact be abandoned and would accordingly no longer be
protected as his home after the two moved into the store: and his par-
ticipation in public affairs, including voting, in Tarpon Springs.
On facts strikingly similar, the same conclusion was later reached in
McGregor v. Kellum.-2 3 Conveyance of an alleged homestead by the
husband alone direct to his wife was sustained in Rawlins v. Dade Lumber
Co.12 4 The opinion of the majority gets into difficulties in attempting
to uphold such a conveyance, merely on the ground that there were no
1 2 1d. at 359, 22 So. at 684.
12350 Fla. 581, 39 So. 697 (1905). The opinion, by Cockrell, J., illustrates in a
brief statement at 584-585, 39 So. at 698, a recurring type of evidentiary factual
situation establishing the conclusion of fact termed abandonment:
"It is shown conclusively that Dr. James Kellum lived for ten years or more
with his wife and children on the property, cultivating with little success a
small grove, but was persuaded in 1886 to move to the town of Fort
Myers where the greater population would enable him to utilize his profession,
that of a practicing physician, to greater advantage; that he remained at Fort
Myers continuously with his family until his death in 1890, and was there
buried with his wife whose death preceded his a year or more; that he left a
portion of his household goods at the old place, but these were all moved to
Fort Myers in 1888, after a fire had destroyed an outhouse; that he made
some attempt to keep up the orange grove for about two years, when all
attempts were abandoned, and the only attention paid to the place was the
voluntary act of a neighbor who occasionally went over there to secure some
slight fire protection, and that during the four years and more intervening the
move to Fort Myers and the mortgagor's death neither he nor any member of
his family ever saw the old place. On the contrary, he entered at once into the
active life of the town, remained there continuously, maintained himself and
family by the practice of his profession there, and took an unusual amount of
interest in its public affairs and local politics."
...o Fla. 398, 86 So. 334 (1920).
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children, when faced with the express prohibition in Section I of Article X
of the Florida Constitution. The decision is obviously sound, however;
before executing the deed Rawlins left his wife and the homestead prop-
erty with the intention of living elsewhere permanently. He carried out
this intent; and a suit for divorce, ultimately successful, was pending at
the time of conveyance. The record, considered on the whole, establishes
abandonment.
In a fairly recent case,' 2 5 on the other hand, the claim of homestead
was sustained against a creditor alleging abandonment. The record con-
tained the testimony of numerous witnesses that "in passing or visiting
. . . some member of the family would be seen about the Marshall
home."1 2 6 At certain times of the year Marshall spent the major portion
of each week in Jefferson County managing and directing operations on a
large farm owned by a Florida corporation of which he was president and
his wife the sole stockholder. During such period his wife accompanied
him and they lived in an old house on tl-e farm; his children remained in
the city. Marshall voted in Orlando and took an active part in local
politics. Said the Court:
2 7
"Common necessity frequently requires the bread earner to labor
away from his family and home so as to sustain dependents .... "
Temporary absence of the head of the family for reasons of business,
health or pleasure does not constitute abandonment. 12 s Determination as
to abandonment, like ascertainment of the establishment of a homestead,
is a conclusion of fact logically inseparable from the concept of domicile;
and no single evidentiary fact is decisive. Indeed, in Read v. Leitnerl: 29
the rural homestead did not lose its character even though the owner
voted for a time in the city; voting residence, while highly persuasive, is
not conclusive. The principle is set forth with customary thoroughness
by Mr. Justice Whitfield, speaking for a unanimous court:lao
"The Constitution does not expressly require the owner of a home-
"'United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Marshall, 148 Fla. 286, 4 So.2d 337
(1941).
2'Id. at 291, 4 So.2d at 338.
"TId. at 292, 4 So.2d at 339.
"'See Lanier v. Lanier, 95 Fla. 522, 5259, 116 So. 867, 868 (1928).
1 8 0 Fla. 574, 86 So. 425 (1920).
""Id. at 577, 86 So. at 426.
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stead or his family to occupy the home place that may be exempt
from forced sale, but the word 'homestead' implies occupancy as the
home place, though having once in good faith been occupied as the
home place, it is not essential that the occupancy should be continu-
ous, provided the intent to return to it as the homestead continues,
and the absence therefrom is reasonably shown to be for the tempo-
rary benefit of the family. Having once occupied the place as a
homestead, the period of absence and the use of the place must be
consistent with a bona fide intent to return and with the purpose of
the absence, all the relevant circumstances being evidentiary in de-
termining each case on its merits."
Functional Abandonment. When the homestead amendment was adopt-
ed in 1868 Florida was decidedly a frontier community. The aim of the
amendment was -to preserve for the family not only a place in which to
live but also certain minimum physical necessities for producing a living.' 3
The rural homestead accordingly embraced the essentials of the farm-in
short, all "the improvements on the real estate."' L3 2 In order to even
the score, the urban dweller was in turn allowed exemption of improve-
ments to the extent of his "residence and business house," 133 but no more.
This short phrase, innocuous though it sounds, has produced several hun-
dred pages of conflicting judicial pronouncements and decades of litiga-
tion. Even today no reliable solution exists, but an analysis of the various
underlying theories advanced from time to time should at least serve to
outline the nature of the problem-the which is ever the first step toward
solution.
Of all the cases involving functional abandonment, one in particular
stands out as a landmark.' 3 4 Shortly before the turn of the century one
Smith sought an injunction restraining Guckenheimer & Sons from levying
upon his property to satisfy judgment following attachment. The issue
of urban homestead was squarely raised. As might be expected in that
period, the residence and business house were one building, a two-story
frame structure found as a fact to be physically indivisible without de-
struction. Smith, his wife and eight children lived in nine of the ten
rooms constituting the top floor; of the five larger rooms below, Smith
ran a restaurant in one and rented the other four to business tenants.
"'Discussed under Origin and Purpose supra.
"2 FLA. CONST. Art. X, §.
38Ibid.
"'Smith v. Guckenheimer & Sons, 42 Fla. 1, 27 So. 900 (1900).
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He occasionally took in lodgers upstairs. The chancellor accorded Smith
the privilege of selecting a portion of the building as his homestead, his
living quarters to be directly over his place of business. Smith declined.
The chancellor thereupon, as requested by cross-bill of the Guckenheimers,
allotted to Smith as homestead the two south ground-floor rooms, the por-
tion above, the soil underneath, and all vacant land. The remainder was
declared free of exemption. From this decree Smith appealed, raising no
objection to the method of division but insisting rather that the entire
building and lot were exempt. The decree was affirmed by a divided
Court. All admitted that in every case "improvements or buildings de-
tached from and other than the residence and business house... together
with the land supporting them, become subject to execution sales";.
3 5
but here agreement ceased.
Mr. Chief Justice Taylor regretted that the chancellor had stopped
short of subjecting to levy all land covered at any building level by rented
rooms, inasmuch as any such use of any individual room should deter-
mine the use of the underlying soil, and in his opinion "permanent occu-
pancy by others for purposes of revenue" to the homesteader "is not a
legal use that can be invoked to maintain the status of exemptor."'136
12Id. at 53, 27 So. at 90S.
"Id. at 17, 27 So. at 915. He summarized his views as follows at p. 18, 27 So.
at 915:
"The result of the discussion'is, in short, that in cases of separate or detached
buildings upon the urban half acres, that are not the residence or business house
of the owner, nor necessary outbuildings used in connection therewith, such
separate or detached buildings, together with the ground that they occupy and
the ground around them separately devoted to their use, are not exempt. In
those cases where the non-exempt improvement or building is combined in a
single structure that likewise constitutes the residence or business house of the
owner, the soil perpendicularly under and covered by any such non-exempt
improvement is improperly dedicated to other uses than are consistent with the
constitutional right of exemption thereof, and is, therefore, not exempt, and this
whether such non-exempt improvement be situated upon the first, second, third,
fourth or tenth floor of a many storied building, and notwithstanding the fact
that the space perpendicularly above or below such non-exempt improvement may
be properly utilized by the owner for legitimate residence or business purposes;
and the loss by such soil of the quality of exemption carries with it, under the
maxim, cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, the loss of the quality of
exemption to everything perpexdicularly above such soil. It may be that in the
application of this rule the whole of the residence or business house exemption
may be taken away and defeated, but, in such case, the blame must fall upon
the exemptor who thus devotes the same soil to the two inconsistent uses, the
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Mr. Justice Mabry dissented on the ground that occupancy of part
of an indivisible building as one's residence or for carrying on one's occu-
pation imparts homestead character to the entire building.
Mr. Justice Carter, in a separate concurring opinion, stressed the ab-
sence of any objection to the method of dividing the property, and agreed
that division in some manner was mandatory upon an equity court:137
"To give a creditor in such a case the right to sell the entire prop-
erty would deprive the debtor of his homestead and enable the creditor
to sell property forbidden by the constitution. To give the debtor the
entire property would exempt to him property expressly forbidden by
the constitution and deprive the creditor of a right given him by law,
without constitutional or statutory warrant. The fact that a building
is incapable of division does not necessarily prevent the sale under
execution of a particular part of the land covered thereby with the
part of the building situated thereon, for it is wholly unnecessary to
'physically divide' the building to do that, but the anomalous relations
of the co-owners of the building after such sale and the mutual rights
and duties of each, and the specific method of determining just what
portion of the land and building ought to be set aside to the debtor as
part of his homestead, would seem to be proper subjects for legisla-
tion under section 6 of the Homestead Article of the constitution."
Unfortunately this timely suggestion has for nearly half a century
fallen on deaf ears.
Some ten years later the question of abandonment became decisive
as regards the right of a widow to devise a house by will.-3 8 She had lived
there with her first husband, but after his death she had remarried and
moved off the property in order to derive rental income from it. Upon the
death of her second husband she had continued to obtain such income from
this property and had lived in a less expensive cottage rented from a
third party. On these facts abandonment and freedom from exemption
were readily found and decreed; the widow's residence was the cottage on
the other lot.
The 1931 case of Jordan v. Jordan'3 9 is often cited in connection with
one legally sufficient to support the exemption contended for, the other legally
sufficient to defeat or destroy it."
"Id. at 39, 27 So. at 912.
... Matthews v. Jeacle, 61 Fla. 686, 55 So. 865 (1911).
...100 Fla. 1586, 132 So. 466 (1931).
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this problem, although the true basis of decision was that, since the chil-
dren had all left home and the husband and wife had officially separated,
he could no longer be regarded as the head of a family. To be sure, he
and his wife managed to bury the hatchet to the extent of collaborating in
paying taxes and costs of maintenance on the apartment house, and each
occupied an apartment; but the case throws little light on functional
abandonment. Indeed, the opinion refers at times to one house and at
other times to one house consisting of two buildings.140
A year later, however, a lumber company sued a homesteader to fore-
close against his entire property a materialman's lien for building supplies
used without his knowledge in constructing a small house on a corner of
the lot.1 41 The homesteader and his wife had allowed their son-in-law as
licensee to build the house, with the understanding that it would go with
the realty if the homesteader sold his property. A unanimous court called
this abandonment of the portion in question; and enforcement was quite
properly allowed against the small house and the land on which it stood,
even though the parents had taken no part in procuring the material and
knew nothing of that transaction.
Up to this time the soundness of Smith v. Guchenheimer & Sons had
stood unquestioned. In 1932, however, storm clouds appeared. An im-
poverished widow was doing her best to make both ends meet for her
daughter and herself by obtaining what little income she could from
rentals of parts of the old family estate.' 4 2 The rented property com-
prised two buildings: a two-story brick garage, used in part for storing her
car but principally as the repair shop of a tenant, and a one-story frame
building used by her to store flower-pots and by a tenant as a sign-paint-
ing shop. Originally the latter had been constructed as the family garage.
Both buildings were completely detached from the residence, although
this fact is not infrequently misstated. The equities were obviously with
the unfortunate widow, and in reversing the chancellor and holding these
rented buildings free from levy, a divided court introduced a new test:1 43
"The term 'business house' is not defined in the Constitution re-
lating to urban homestead exemptions, but it is plain that the intend-
1 '*1d. at 1591, 132 So. kt 468.
"'"Anderson Mifi and Lumber Co. v. Clement%, 101 Fla. 523, 134 So. 588 (1931).
"Cowdery v. Herring, 106 Fla. 567, 143 So. 433 (1932).
1-1d. at 571, 143 So. at 435.
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ment is to preserve as exempt, a reasonable portion of the home3tead
improvements, in addition to the owner's actual residence, when it
appears that the improvements concerned are being used as a means of
making the owner's livelihood.
"Here the garage and paint shop in effect constitute a portion
of the widowed homesteader's 'business house' under the circum-
stances, because it was not already shown that the widow, upon whose
homestead land these rented structures were located, had any other
real 'business house.' On the other hand it was shown that Mrs.
Cowdery depended principally upon the rents from these structures as
her means of living."
On rehearing' 4 4 the thrust of this concept was deflected somewhat by
a per curiam opinion pointing out that a homestead of less than one-half
acre had been admitted, that the creditor had the burden of proving that
there were more improvements or buildings thereon than the residence and
business house of the widow, and that this burden had not been met. Just
why it had not been met, when existence of the two buildings, physical
detachment, and rental to others were established, was discreetly left un-
answered.
The reaction of the bar was precisely what one would anticipate. One
Larson, owner in fee simple of a lot admittedly homestead, constructed an
apartment house and garage for rental purposes on its south end, and later
conveyed the entire property to his wife via a third party in one day.' 45
The decree of the chancellor upholding the validity of a mortgage made
by Larson's widow on the whole lot was unanimously affirmed as to the
apartment house, garage, and underlying soil, but reversed as to the rest.
Cowdery v. Herring was cavalierly distinguished on the ground that "the
owner living on her homestead merely rented for a tool house a small
garage that had been used as a part of the city homestead property." In a
direct reversal of the ratio decidendi of the Cowdery case, the Court stated
emphatically: 3'4 6
"An apartment house for renting purposes is not a 'business house
of the owner' of a homestead within the meaning of Section 1, Article
X, of the constitution of Florida."
6106 Fla. 574, 144 So. 348 (1932).
2401d. at 6, 185 So. at 868.
" McEwen v. Larson, 136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866 (1939).
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This decision, in turn, led quite logically to O'Neal V. Miller,1 4 7 in
which the appellants relied on Cowdery v. Herring and the appellees on
McEwen v. Larson. The facts were rather complicated. Rosa Devoe
left her husband for the alleged reason of cruelty, taking their small daugh-
ter with her, and did not return until after his death. Nevertheless the
marital relation continued as a matter of law, and she did not acquire
another home elsewhere. Her husband meanwhile mortgaged his own
residence, four small houses, and a fish store, all on the homestead prop-
erty and all rented to others except his residence. Rosa Devoe, who re-
occupied the residence upon her return, testified that her husband's sole
income was derived from these rentals. A divided court held that the resi-
dence alone was exempt. In the concurring opinion a further basis of
distinction was propounded, namely, the use to.which the tenant puts the
rented structures.1 48
In 1945 still another principle was evolved in Lockhart v. Sasser: 4 9
the vertical-line theory. The devise of his apartment house by a home-
steader was voided by a majority on the ground that the entire building
was homestead. It contained six apartments, and the testator lived in the
one on the ground floorI Oddly enough, Cowdery v. Herring was distin-
guished, in spite of the fact that the same conclusion was reached in that
decision even as to separate buildings. Smith v. Guckenheimer was differ-
entiated on the ground that "the improvement was shown to be such that
it was divisible by a perpendicular line."'35 0  This statement, unfortu-
145143 Fla. 171, 196 So. 478 (1940).
'ld. at 182, 196 So. at 482. The language is:
"In the Cowdery case the garage and paint shop were improvements in the form
of commercial establishments, from which the owner derived her principal means
of livelihood, and as such were held to constitute a 'business house' within the
intendment of the Constitution. In the McEwen case, while it is true that the
apartment house was a source of income, such income was derived from persons
who came to reside on the property, and the apartment house and land required
for its.operation and maintenance were held to have been abandoned as homestead
property.
"Applying the principles in the above cases, our conclusion is that the
houses which were built and maintained for residential purposes by Herman [sc]
Devoe did not constitute homestead property at the time of the execution of said
mortgage on December 9, 1927."
111156 Fla. 339, 22 So.2d 763 (1945). Although the point was not specifically
discussed on appeal, the chancellor evidently used this vertical-line theory in Efstathlon
v. Saucer, 158 Fla. 422, 29 So.2d 304 (1947).
1 0 d. at 340, 22 So.2d at 764.
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nately, alleges the exact opposite of the facts. Smith's building was legally
divided solely because the chancellor chose to divide it; the building was
specifically found not divisible without destruction, and in drawing the
perpendicular line the chancellor cut off several of Smith's family bed-
rooms on the top floor and allotted him in return a large storeroom, pre-
viously rented out, on the ground floor. The conclusion is inescapable
that Lockhart v. Sasser overrules for all practical purposes Smith v.
Guckenheimer and follows the dissent of Mr. Justice Mabry therein; but
the fact remains that the opinion does not so state.
Summarizing the issue of functional abandonment, five theories have
been advanced for determining whether a building is homestead:
1. the use made of it by the homesteader, qualified by the rule that
any portion not occupied by the homesteader either as his residence
or as the place in which he exercises his calling is not exempt;
2. the use made of it by the homesteader, qualified by the rule that
if any part of a building is occupied by the homesteader either
as his residence or as the place in which he exercises his calling, the
entire building is exempt;
3. the recognition that renting is one's business at law whenever it
is one's business in fact, with the corollary that a building rented
is in such instances one's "business house";
4. the use made of the building or portion in question by the tenant;
and
5. the vertical-line theory.
Each theory can muster some support, but all are subject to serious
criticism. The vertical-line theory, for example, accords exemption to an
enormous apartment house, provided the owner occupies the entire top
floor as a penthouse. Yet his neighbor with two small parallel duplex
apartments in one building loses exemption as to the rented half. Ad-
mittedly a line should be drawn somewhere, but no valid reason has been
offered for making it vertical, or indeed for making it a straight line at all.
Estates less than sole ownership in fee of one building are not unknown
to the law.
The tenant-use theory drives a sharp wedge between a warehouse rented
out and an apartment house, assuming in each instance that the renting of
the building in question is the owner's only business.
Any line finally drawn will of necessity be arbitrary, and the basic
motivating factors are matters of broad social policy, better determined
by the legislative process. On the one hand it is usually conceded, even
35
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today, that a man should pay his debts. On the other hand, our source
of supply of cannon-fodder must not be endangered. The family can
readily be preserved, however, without making owners of huge estates, large
apartment houses and department stores judgment-proof to the extent of
these entire buildings. A workable compromise might be reached by an
amendment to the Florida Constitution, placing a value limit on the prop-
erty subject to exemption' 5 ' and exempting rented structures when their
rental is in fact the business of the claimant. Even without amendment,
the Legislature should by now be able to define "business house." Fail-
ing this, the Supreme Court of Florida could return to the ratio decidendi
of the Cowdery case,15 2 and hold once again that renting, if it be one's
principal business in fact, is also one's business at law. In any event,
rented structures or rented portions thereof could consistently be separated,
regardless of whether the line be vertical, horizontal or jagged. In basic
property law, certainty is an element that should not be cast lightly aside
or left to the vagaries of architectural design.
Contiguity. Turninng now to rural property, when a homesteader re-
sides outside the limits of an incorporated city or town he may claim as
exempt up to 160 acres of land, as well as ''Uc improvements on the real
estate .... "15 As a further protection, no homestead may be reduced
in area by inclusion within the limits of an incorporated city or town
without the consent of the owner.' 54 Forthright though this phraseology
may seem, interpretation has nonetheless proved necessary. In the main
it has been strictly logical.
Suppose a homesteader owns a lot in town and also a tract in the
country, both of wnich do not exceed 160 acres. Can he claim both par-
cels as his homestead? We have seen that he can have but one home,
and that if he should happen to possess two or more houses the designation
of one as his home, or principal residence, is a question of fact. Further-
more, the land and house in town are not "on the real estate" outside the
town, nor is his business house "on the real estate" within the town if it is
on the country land. Obviously one parcel or the other is his residence,
and only that one can be his homestead. Our Supreme Court settled this
question in an early decision.' 55
A majority of the states do this; see note 9 supra.
1"See note 142 supra.
l"SFL. CoNsT. Art. X, §1.
uIFr . CoNsr. Art. X, §5.
1'Oliver v. Snowden, 18 Fla. 823 (1882).
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Assume, however, that the homesteader owns more than 160 contiguous
acres in the country. In such event, he may select any 160 acres, contiguous
each to another;156 but should he refuse to designate such homestead
portion or designate it to the dissatisfaction of his creditor, the latter may
request a survey, and in the event of dispute the chancellor will make the
choice. 15 7 The use made of those portions of the tract that are not phy-
sically occupied as the residence is immaterial; indeed, such other parcels
need not be enclosed or cultivated.' 5 8 All that is necessary is that there
be one tract or contiguous tracts not exceeding 160 acres, and perhaps that
the homesteader occupy some part of it as his principal residence.
The word "perhaps" is used because of the inept phraseology of Section
222.03 of Florida Statutes 1941, quoted below.1 59 This enactment, which
is hardly a model of draftsmanship, not only contains the ambiguity re-
5 FLA. STAT. §§222.01, 222.02 (1941) ; see Yowell v. Rogers, 128 Fla. 881, 882,
175 So. 772, 773 (1937). The first six sections of Article X of the Constitution do
not mention contiguity. Section 7, however, creating the tax exemption, places it
on the "home and contiguous real property, as defined in Article 10 [sic], Section 1,"
thereby indicating that contiguity is implied in Section 1. The Legislature has
expressed its view after a fashion in FLA. STAT. §222.03 (1941), quoted infra in note
159, but at best the section Is ambiguous. It is ably criticized in REDFAN, WILLS AN
ADMisTRATiON OF ESTATFS IN FLORIDA 397 n.25 (2d ed. 1946).
X'5 FLA. STAT. §§222.03, 222.08-222.10 (1941); cf. Fort v. Rigdon, 100 Fla. 398,
129 So. 847 (1930); Smith v. Guckenheimer & Sons, 42 Fla. 1, 27 So. 900 (1900).
" sArmour & Co. v. Hulvey, 73 Fla. 294, 74 So. 212 (1917) (entire military academy
held exempt) ; McDougall v. Meginniss, 21 Fla. 362 (1885) (unused land held part of
homestead); cf. Fort v. Rigdon, supra note 157 (complaint of homesteader, seeking
to have best portions set aside, rejected).
"'The full text reads (italics supplied):
"If the creditor in any execution or process sought to be levied is dissatisfied
with the quantity of land selected and set apart, and shall himself, or by his agent
or attorney, notify the officer levying, the officer shall at the creditor's request
cause the same to be surveyed, and when the homestead is not within the corporate
limits of any town or city, the person claiming said exemption shall have the right
to set apart that portion of land belonging to him which includes the residence, or
not, at his option, and if the first tract or parcel does not contain one hundred
and sixty acres, the said officer shall set apart the remainder from any other tract or
tracts claimed by the debtor, but in every case taking all the land lying contiguous
until the whole quantity of one hundred and sixty acres is made up. The person
claiming the exemption shall not be forced to take as his homestead any tract
or portion of a tract, if any defect exists in the title, except at his option. The
expense of such survey shall be chargeable on the execution as costs; but if it
shall appear that the person claiming such exemption does not own more than
one hundred and sixty acres in the state, the expenses of said survey shall be
paid by the person directing the same to be made."
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ferred to in footnote 156 supra, but also creates an even more serious
problem. Does it mean simply that the debtor may elect to meet his obli-
gation when sued and waive his homestead exemption at that time? If so,
the provision cannot alter any of the rights already existing under the
Constitution,' 60 and, of course, it cannot limit waiver to country residents
alone.
On the other hand, it may well mean that the rural debtor is privileged
to claim property on which he does not reside.' 6 ' If so, however, the ex-
emption is purely statutory, and obviously has nothing to do with home-
stead; a homestead without a home is about as readily perceived as a
copyright without any copy. Accordingly, all the reasons sustaining the
homestead exemption, including the specific constitutional authorization,
vanish in this instance, a mere label being insufficient to change the true
nature of this new statutory exemption; and the question at once arises
as to whether owners of non-homestead property as a class can by merb
legislative fiat be split so as to exempt some of them from the practical
necessity of meeting their obligations and deny exemption to the others,
solely on the basis of whether their property is located outside or inside a
town or city. This patent discrimination cannot stand unless some reason-
able ground for the differentiation be offered;' 8 2 and to date this has not
been done.
Furthermore, in Fort v. Rigdonloa appellants sought reversal of a de-
cree allotting them the residence and a contiguous tract totaling 160 acres,
their contention being that they should be allowed to choose the most
valuable portions of an estate comprising 560 contiguous acres. The Su-
preme Court unanimously declared in its affirmance" that the chancellor
was bound to select the tract upon which the actual residence was located.
Numerous dicta uniformly support this view.' 64
"'As regards waiver see the early analysis in Patterson v. Taylor, 15 Fla. 336,
343 (1875) (personalty). Bu cf. Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 165, 84 So. 151,
154 (1920); Albritton v. Scott, 73 Fla. 856, 858, 74 So. 975 (1917) (realty).
'This interpretation, which is far sounder from a grammatical standpoint, is
ad6pted by no less an authority than Redfearn in his WnrXs AND ADuMIISmAriON oF
EsTAmS n; FnourA 412 (2d ed. 1946).
""The pertinent provisions, commonly known as equal protection and substantive
due process, are contained in FLA. CONsT. Decl. of Rights §§1, 12 and U. S. CoNsT.
Amend. XIV.
10100 Fla. 398, 129 So. 847 (1930).
" See, e.g., Yowell v. Rogers, 128 Fla. 881, 882, 175 So. 772, 773 (1937);
Matthews v. Jeacle, 61 Fla. 686, 691, 55 So. 865, 867 (1911); Saxon v. Rawls,
51 Fla. 555, 558, 41 So. 594, 595 (1906); Brandies v. Perry, 39 Fla. 172, 176,
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Returning more specifically to the problem of contiguity, can two or
more tracts of land in the country, covering 160 acres or less but not touch-
ing each other at any point, be lumped together as one homestead if owned
by one family head and farmed by him as a unit? Or must they be con-
tiguous? The Constitution is silent on the matter, but the early leading
case of Brandies v. Perry'6 5 established unequivocally the necessity of
contiguity in setting up a homestead. No question arose until 1920, when
the following theory was advanced in Clark v. Cox, an abandonment dis-
pute:' 6 6
"... the question whether actual contiguity is required must be de-
termined in each case on its peculiar facts."
Unfortunately the opinion does not explain the distinction between
"actual contiguity" and mere "contiguity," perhaps because no such dis-
tinction can exist outside the realm of metaphysics. Two tracts of land
either touch at one point or they do not. If they do, they are contiguous;
if they do not, they are not contiguous. The answer is one of pure -fact,
and can be readily ascertained.
Quite probably the statement was intended to signify that contiguity
is not always requisite as a matter of law. This is true, although in ex-
ceptional circumstances only, such as those exhibited in Clark v. Cox. A
railroad had constructed its line completely across a homestead tract, and
the homesteader and his wife had later conveyed in fee to the owners of
the railroad a strip extending fifty feet on each side of the center of the
track. There was also a county highway running along the strip. The
rule laid down in Brandies v. Perry was not applied. The result is sound,
but to maintain that determination depends "in each case on its peculiar
facts" is to eliminate rules needlessly-and this should be resorted to in
the law in only those instances in which formulation of principle is at the
time impracticable.
22 So. 268, 270 (1897); McDougall v. Meginniss, 21 Fla. 362, 369, 372 (1885);
Drucker v. Rosenstein, 19 Fla. 191, 195, 198 (1882); Oliver v. Snowden, 18 Fla.
823, 836 (1882) ; Baker v. State, 17 Fla. 406, 409 (1879). The earlier opinions were
written during the effective period of the forerunners of FLA. STAT. §222.03 (1941),
which corresponded exactly to the portion italicized in note 159 supra in words and
meaning and differed in immaterial punctuation only, namely, FLA. REv. STAT. §2000
(1892) and Fla. Laws 1873, c. 1944. The latter, however, amended Fla. Laws 1869,
c. 1715, §3, materially in the wording here analyzed.
1639 Fla. 172, 22 So. 268 (1897).
1080 Fla. 63, 69, 85 So. 173, 174 (1920).
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Shortly before this decision, the problem had been considered in Shone
v. Bellmore.'8 7 The bill to set aside certain land as homestead alleged
the fact of contiguity specifically, and by demurrer to the whole bill the
defendants admitted such allegation. The necessity of contiguity was ac-
cordingly not in issue, but in a dictum' 6 8 the Court summarized the rule
in Brandies v. Perry and cited the approval thereof by dictum in Milton v.
Milton.' o9 The opinion then suggested:
1 7 0
"... there is no reason why the owner of a homestead which lies in
a compact usual body may not sell such parts of it as he may desire
and retain the remainder for his homestead so long as he does not sep-
arate one part of his homestead thus remaining from another by inter-
vening lots or blocks which he has conveyed to others."
It remained for a federal court, though quite properly attempting to
follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida as the final word on
the meaning of any provision of Florida law, to hold without citation of
authority that separation of some portions of a homestead tract from the
rest by sale of land lying between does not constitute abandonment of such
separated portions.'
7 '
The tax section of the Homestead Amendment, although it admittedly
deals with a separate and distinct type of exemption and was added half
a century later, may throw some light on the matter, in that it specifically
refers to "the said home and contiguous real property as defined in Article
10 [sic], Section 1. ' 172 In the tax field there can accordingly be no doubt
that contiguity is mandatory;173 and the language just quoted contains at
least an inference that the citizens of Florida regard contiguity as an in-
tegral part of the concept "homestead."
Four theories, then, have been advanced as regards contiguity:
1. It is never necessary.
2. It is always necessary.
S. Acquisition and abandonment of the homestead are governed by
different rules, contiguity being mandatory in the former instance
but unnecessary in the latter.
11t75 Fla. 515, 78 So. 605 (1918).
'"Id. at 524, 78 So. at 607.
2"63 Fla. 533, 535, 58 So. 718, 719 (1912).
r17Shone v. Bellmore, 75 Fla. 515, 525, 78 So. 605, 608 (1918) (italics supplied).
ITiCroker v. Croker, 7 F.2d 218 (S. D. Fla. 1925).
"FLA. CoNsT. Art. X, §7.
"'State ex rd. Dunscombe v. Courson, 144 Fla. 439, 198 So. 108 (1940).
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4. Contiguity is necessary in all instances other than those in which
abandonment is, or could be, compelled in the public interest, in
which latter event the abandonment is limited strictly to the por-
tion so transferred and does not destroy the homestead character
of the remaining portions.
The first alternative leads to obvious absurdities; an individual could
have small country homesteads all the way from Pensacola to Key West,
provided they did not exceed a total of 160 acres. The second works a
severe hardship in instances of loss of a transecting parcel by eminent do-
main, and necessitates overruling Clark v. Cox and disregarding the dictum
in Shone v. Bellmore. The third principle introduces a distinction not as
yet accepted by the Florida courts and unexplained in the one federal de-
cision either by any reasons or by any Florida authorities. It would enable
an individual to establish a homestead composed of separated parcels
merely by acquirihg intervening land temporarily. Having established
contiguity, he could then sell the unwanted land without impairing the
homestead character of the rest. No advantages likely to result from such
a differentiation have been suggested.
The fourth basis of decision squares with what the Florida courts have
consistently maintained as the Florida law, and results in fair treatment as
well as uniformity. It protects a homesteader who happens to be singled
out for condemnation proceedings, yet without making serious inroads on
the uniformity of the requirements of contiguity. If he voluntarily splits
his property, he has no one to blame but himself.
PART II-TRANSFER or Ho EsTEAD REALTY
Assuming that the realty in question is the homestead1 .7 4 of its owner,
and subject to the predominating rules of property law previously dis-
cussed,' 7 5 the Florida Constitution and statutes place certain restrictions
upon its alienation, whether by testamentary disposition or by intervivos
deed. The exact nature and effect of these restrictions, while generally
filtered through the spectroscope of judicial deliberation so as to produce a
ray of pure and definite color, have on occasion become blurred by con-
flicting elements of public policy and shadowed by doubtful interpreta-
tion of the organic law.
'"Throughout Part II the word "homestead" is confined, in the interests of
dear presentation, to real property alone unless a broader signification is specifically
indicated. Homestead personalty is dealt with in Part IMI infra.
...See Part I, 4 supra.
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It is beyond dispute that the principles discussed earlier in connection
with the exemption of homestead property from forced sale apply here,L7 0
rather than the recent rules governing the exemption of homestead property
from taxation. Whenever the realty in question is held by its owner un-
der such circumstances as to make it exempt from forced sale, then it is
subject to the restrictions on alienation laid down by the Florida Consti-
tution and the statutes; and this is true regardless of whether its owner
takes advantage of the $5,000 exemption from taxation.
1 7 7
The Florida Constitution, following the custom among such instru-
ments, deals with this phase of the homestead question in barest outline,
leaving to the Legislature and the courts the task of implementing and
delineating its intent. The authority of the Legislature to deal with this
problem is found in Section 6 of Article X, and of course the Supreme
Court has always conceded its own authority to interpret the Constitution.
The most fruitful approach to the question of alienation of homestead
realty is to place the cart before the horse and to consider first the matter
of devise and descent of the homestead, before looking into the restraints
placed upon the owner of such property while he is still enjoying its use.
The reason for this unnatural juxtaposition lies in the fact that the prohi-
bition against the willing of homestead land in certain situations has been
employed as a basis for subjecting its owner while living to restrictions on
the use of his property that are not -readily gathered from an uninspired
reading of the Constitution.' 7 8
1. Devise and Descent of Homestead Realty
The only light cast by the Florida Constitution on the ownership of
the homestead after the head of the family dies is found in the statement
in Section 2 of Article X that the exemption "shall inure to the widow and
heirs of the party entitled to such exemption," and in Section 4, which
contains the caveat:
"'Nothing in this Article shall be construed to prevent the holder
of a homestead from alienating his or her homestead so exempted by
deed or mortgage duly executed by himself or herself, and by husband
"'FrA. CoasT. ArL Y, §§1, 2, 4; see McEwen v. Larson, 136 Fla. 1, 7, 18S So.
866, 868 (1939).
zrT. CONST. Art. X, §7; see Part V infra. It is true, however, that the
existence of the tax exemption may be of some evidentlary value.
T'See Part AI 3 infra.
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and wife, if such relation exists; nor if the holder be without children
to prevent him or her from disposing of his or her homestead by will
in a manner prescribed by law."
It is, of course, clear that the homestead exemption and the title to the
physical property constituting the homestead are two distinct affairs.17 9
And it is equally clear that an exemption cannot exist, in any real sense,
in the absence of some property to which it may attach.' 8 0 Unless the
homestead, upon the death of the head of the family, passes to one or more
of the persons to whom the homestead exemption inures, the exemption is
lost. The question then becomes: Under what circumstances must title
to the homestead, upon the death of the head of the family, pass to those
to whom the exemption inures; and conversely, under what circumstances
may the head of the family cause the title to pass to someone not entitled
to the exemption?
Everyone admits that the Legislature, unless inhibited by the Consti-
tution, has complete authority to determine what happens to one's prop-
erty when he dies.' 8 ' The Florida Probate Law mentions the home-
stead' 8 2 in two places. The first provides:' 8 3
"Any property, real or personal, held by any title, legal or equit-
able, with or without actual seisin may be devised or bequeathed
by will; provided, however, that whenever a person who is head of a
family, residing in this state and having a homestead therein, dies
and leaves either a widow or lineal descendants or both surviving him,
the homestead shall not be the subject of devise, but shall descend
"'0Coleman v. Williams, 146 Fla. 45, 200 So. 207 (1941); Menendez v. Rodriguez,
106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932) (realty); see Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 346,
22 So. 687, 691 (1897) (dealing with exempt personal property).
"'Ibid.; see generally the opinion by Brown, J., in Moor v. Price, 98 Fla. 276,
123 So. 768 (1929), as to the distinction between exemption and property right.
Another excellent discussion of this question is found in the opinion by Mabry, J,
in Godwin v. King, 31 Fla. 525, 13 So. 108 (1893). See also Wilson v. Fridenburg,
19 Fla. 461 (1883).
l.The relation of this general principle to the homestead provisions is pointedly
analyzed by Sebring, J., in Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So.2d 615 (1944).
See also Caro v. Caro, 45 Fla. 203, 218, 34 So. 309, 314 (1903); RPEV aN, WMLS AND
ADmNI-STRATION OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA 26 (2d ed. 1946).
1"'The term "homestead" here refers to realty only. See Part M infra as regards
homestead personalty. Cf. Adams v. Adams, 158 Fla. 173, 28 So.2d 254 (1946).
""
3 FLA. STAT. §731.05 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
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as otherwise provided in this law for the descent of homesteads."
The second prescribes that whenever the property in question is home-
stead, and the head of the family
8 4 dies: 85
"The homestead shall descend as other property; provided, how-
ever, that if the decedent is survived by a widow and lineal descen-
dants, the widow shall take a life estate in the homestead, with vest-
ed remainder to the lineal descendants in being at the time of the
death of the decedent."
These statutes are not in conflict with the Florida Constitution in re-
spect of their authority to alter the substantive rules of descent, 18 but
they do approach the question in a somewhat haphazard fashion. The use
of the term "lineal descendants" in the statutes results from the provision
in the Florida law of succession' 8 7 that intestate property shall descend
first to the surviving spouse and lineal descendants of a decedent. The
statutory terminology dealing with restrictions on the devise of homestead
is narrower than that employed in Section 2 of Article X,188 which pro-
vides that the exemption shall inure to the "widow and heirs" of the head
of the family, and yet is somewhat broader than that of Section 4, which
uses the word "children" in imposing what has come to be regarded by
the judiciary as an inferential restriction on the devise of a homestead.
It is possible to envision many anomalous situations that might arise from
this divergence in terminology; accordingly, at a time when constitutional
revision is in the air, an attempt might well be made to achieve at least
some degree of accuracy in expression and consistency in thought, prefer-
ably by conforming all statutory provisions to whatever is decided upon
and then stated clearly in any new constitution.
Since the homestead law is designed to protect and preserve the fam-
ily, its effect on the right to devise or inherit will be analyzed from the
standpoint of each type of membership in the family.
"s'See Part 1, 2 supra. It should be recalled that a woman may be the head of
a family, as in Bigelow v. Dunphe, 144 Fla. 330, 198 So. 13 (1940), yet she cannot
leave a "widow."
"
8 FLA. STAT. §731.27 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
.'Nesmith v. Nesmith, 155 Fla. 823, 21 So2d 789 (1945); Saxon v. Rawls, 51
Fla. 55, 41 So. 594 (1906) (as to early statute) ; cf. note 179 supra.
aTFL STAT.. §731.23 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"1 F.A. CoxsT. Art. X, quoted in full at the end of Part II.
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Hasband. The homestead law contemplates primarily the normal sit-
uation, in which the head of the family and the owner of the homestead is
the husband. When he dies leaving either a widow or lineal descendants
surviving, he is not permitted to alter by will the prescribed disposition of
the property. 18 9 If, however, he outlives his wife and lineal descendants,
even though he continues to occupy his dwelling as the head of a family
composed of himself and other types of dependents, there is nothing to
prevent his devising the homestead as he may choose.190 Again, if he
outlives his wife, and his children grow up and move away to homes of
their own, leaving him with no dependents, he is then free to dispose of
his dwelling by will, as well as by intervivos deed-not because his chil-
dren are adults but rather because he is no longer the head of a family
and consequently his dwelling is no longer a homestead. 19 1
Turning to the problem of the in terrorem clause, may the husband
require that his widow or lineal descendants forego their rights in the home-
stead as a prerequisite to receiving any benefits from the provisions of his
will? There is authority in other jurisdictions that such an election may
be forced by will. 1 9 2 In Palmer v. Palmer'93 the Supreme Court of
Florida expressly refrained from deciding this question and limited its
decision to treating as a nullity the portion of a will attempting to devise
the homestead when unaccompanied by any expression of intent to require
an election on the part of those entitled to the homestead. Later, in Shone
v. Bellmore, 194 the Court quoted with approval language from the Palmer
case that, taken by itself, appears to deny the right of a testator to require
"9FLA. STAT. §§731.05, 731.27 (Cum. Supp. 1947); Efstathion v. Saucer, 158 Fla.
422, 29 So.2d 304 (1947); Bess v. Anderson, 102 Fla. 1127, 136 So. 898 (1931);
Shone v. Belmore, 75 Fla. 515, 78 So. 605 (1918); Johns v. Bowden, 68 Fla. 32,
66 So. 155 (1914); Griffith v. Griffith, 59 Fla. 512, 52 So. 609 (1910); Saxon v.
Rawls, 51 Fla. 555, 41 So. 594 (1906); Palmer v. Palmer, 47 Fla. 200, 35 So. 983
(1904). Regarding the similar provision in the Constitution of 1868 see Moseley v.
Taylor, 68 Fla. 294, 67 So. 95 (1914); Wilson v. Fridenburg, 19 Fla. 461 (1882).
An unequivocal conveyance, though reserving a life estate, has been upheld as a
present transfer; see note 297 infra. But a purported conveyance by either a
revocable trust or a deed to be delivered after death has been stricken down as a testa-
mentary disposition; see note 275 infra.
1001bid.
. 9 See Part I, 2 supra.
9 'See REDYEArN, WuLs AND AD InnsTRATION OP ESTATES IN FLOnIA 302, 410
(2d ed. 1946).
"9S47 Fla. 200, 35 So. 983 (1904).
...75 Fla. 515, 78 So. 605 (1918).
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such an election; but the express refusal in that case to decide the question
was either overlooked or ignored.
The language in Shone v. Bellmore is likewise mere dictum, and the
question today remains undecided in Florida. There is no cogent reason
for striking down a will that requires such an election. The purpose of the
homestead law is not defeated by a will of that character, since those en-
titled to the homestead are not likely to forego their rights unless their
own advantage so dictates. Nor does public policy lend any support to
the notion that a widow or lineal descendant should have his cake and
eat it too.
In the normal situation the husband is the head of the family, in which
event the family dwelling, if owned by his wife, cannot be homestead and
therefore is not subject to the homestead restrictions at all.195 Neverthe-
less, a wife can be the head of the family; and the dwelling owned by -the
wife is homestead property under these circumstances.1 9 6 The rights of
her surviving husband are not entirely dear. The Florida Probate Law' 9 7
guarantees a surviving husband no mandatory share in his wife's estate
corresponding to dower, although the statute governing descent' 9 8 does
give him a child's share in his wife's intestate property, a fact which may
in a broad sense make him an "heir" of his wife.199
It may at least be argued, then, that a surviving husband, if the home-
stead descends to him, obtains along with it the exemption from forced
sale; but by no extension of implication can one validly contend that the
terms'bf the Florida Probate Law require an estate in the homestead to de-
scend to a surviving husband. Under'the provisions of these statutes a
wife owning a homestead upon her death and survived by her husband
alone is free to devise such property in whatever manner she may
choose.20 0 The statutes do forbid her to will her homestead when she is
survived by lineal descendants;2O1 and in such event a surviving husband
2'See notes 49-51 supmra.
2"See note 56 supra.
"'FLA. STAT., CC. 731-736 (Cum. Supp. 1947); as to dower see §731.34.
*FI. STAT. §731.23 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
2"See Reimer v. Smith, 105 Fla. 671, 679, 142 So. 603, 605 (1932). But see
Arnold v. Wells, 100 Fla. 1470, 1482, 131 So. 400, 405 (1930). Cf. Wilson v.
Fridenburg, 19 Fla. 461 (1882) (holding widow not "heir" under FLA. CONST.
Art. IX, §3 (1868), which provided accrual of exemption to "heirs" without mention-
ing widow).
2'FL. STAT. §§731.05, 731.27 (Cum. Supp. 1947). FLA. CONST. Art. X, §4
does not forbid devise by either husband or wife when without children.
011bid.
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presumably takes his child's share20 2 clothed with the exemption from
forced sale. No provision is made for a life estate in the husband with
vested remainder to the lineal descendants, as is prescribed for his wife
when he dies first.
20 3
This illogical and unrealistic discrepancy has never been explained.
Since, as noted at the beginning of this article, the purpose of the home-
stead law is to protect and preserve the family-and not merely the very
young, the very old, or the allegedly weaker sex-the law should extend
its beneficence to a dependent, incapacitated and indigent husband. In
such type of family the economic jolt occasioned by loss of the home is
fully as severe as that suffered by the surviving wife in the normal family.
Wife. As has just been explained, the wife who is the head of a family
and the owner of its homestead is expressly restricted as to devise in the
one instance in which she is survived by lineal descendants; in such event
the homestead must descend as intestate property.
For the wife of more docile temperament, however, who permits her
husband to occupy at least the nominal headship of the family and to hold
title to the family dwelling, Florida law provides adequate safeguards to
protect her and the other members of the family. Her husband cannot will
the homestead away from her, even though no lineal descendants be living
at the time of his death. 20 4 When she survives him and there are no
lineal descendants, she takes his entire interest in the property upon his
death by virtue of the law of descent. If she and lineal descendants both
survive him, then she receives a life estate in the homestead, with vested
remainders to the lineal descendants in being at the time of his death.2 0 5
Prior to the adoption of the present Probate Law in 1933, a widow in
Florida had the option of asserting her right of dower or of claiming a
child's part in her husband's homestead. 2 0 6 The dower right consisted of
a one-third interest for life in property of which her husband died seized
or had conveyed without relinquishment of dower right by her; a child's
02FA. STAT. §73123 (Cum. Supp. 1947) gives the surviving spouse a child's
part of the intestate property, or all of it when there are no lineal descendants.
3FLA. STAT. §731.27 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
g"See note 189 supra.
'FLA. STAT. §731.27 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
'FLA. COmP. GEN. LAWS §§5484, 5493 (1927); discussed in Church v. Lee, 102
Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931), and by Brown, J., in his masterful opinion in Moore
v. Price, 98 Fla. 276, 123 So. 768 (1929). Godwin v. King, 31 Fla. 525, 13 So. 108
(1893), construes the Constitution of 1868 in relation to dower.
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part was an absolute proportionate interest, which of course varied with
the number of children.
2 0 7
Today a widow has no dower right in her husband's homestead, and
is given no option as to the share she will take in such property.20 8 Upon
his death she takes either his entire interest in the homestead in the ab-
sence of lineal descendants, or a life estate when there are lineal descen-
dants surviving him.2 0 9 Theoretically, at least, a widow need not take
any affirmative action in order to secure her rights in the homestead. 21 0
As a practical matter, however, she may find that unless she asserts her
claim to the homestead the probate court may include such property in
the administration of the husband's estate and thus multiply the difficul-
ties involved in establishing her claim.2 1 '
It is common practice in Florida today for a husband and wife to take
title to their homestead as tenants by the entirety.2 12 Whenever the
homestead is held in this manner, the entire interest in the property passes
by operation of law to the surviving spouse upon the death of the other,
and neither homestead nor probate provisions apply.213
Lineal Descendants. Although the Florida Constitution provides sim-
ply that the homestead exemption "shall inure to the widow and heirs"
of the homesteader21 4 and refers only inferentially to the rights of "chil-
dren" in homestead property,2 1 5 the Probate Law employs the term "lineal
descendants" in dealing with the devise and descent of homesteads.
21 6
2'Ibid.
208F" STAT. §73134 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"'FA. STAT. §§731.27, 731.23 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
2 'At common law this was true as to dower, but today F"A. STAT. §73135 (Cure.
Supp. 1947) requires the widow to file with the county judge an executed and
acknowledged election to take dower within nine months after the first publication
of the notice to creditors of her deceased husband's estate; otherwise the dower
right is regarded as waived.
"See Part IV, 3 infra, dealing with laches. FLA. STAT. §95.23 (1941), a curative
statute, was applied to homestead rights in Barnott v. Proctor, 128 Fla. 63, 174 So.
404 (1937), thus pointing up another danger inherent in delay.
'"See, e.g.: Coleman v. Williams, 146 Fla. 45, 200 So. 207 (1941); Harkins v.
Holt, 124 Fla. 774, 169 So. 481 (1936); Oates v. New York Life Ins. Co., 113 Fla.
678, 152 So. 671 (1934), rehearing denied, 116 Fla. 253, 152 So. 672 (1934) ; Menendez
v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932); Part I, 4 suPra, especially note 100.
2"Ibid.; see also Note, 1 U. or FiA. L. REv. 433 (1948).
"1'F.a CoNsr. Art. X, §2.
2'rFiA. CONST. Art. X, §4.
11'Fi& STAT. §§731.05, 73127 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
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The result is that only lineal descendants of the owner of a homestead in
being at his death, as well as his widow of course, are guaranteed a prop-
erty interest in the homestead realty. When he is survived by a widow,
his lineal descendants in being at the time of his death take vested re-
mainders in the homestead, subject to the widow's life estate.2 17 If there
be no widow, these lineal descendants take an immediate absolute inter-
est,2 1 8 divided among them according to the per stirpes rule.2 19 The
vested remainder may not be defeated by the devise of the husband;
neither may the absolute interest be affected by the will of either a male
or a female homesteader.
2 20
Lineal descendants in this context include children of the decedent's
own blood, whether already born or en ventre sa mere at the time of de-
cedent's death, 221 and whether minor or adult.22 2 An illegitimate child
will not be included among the lineal descendants of its father for purposes
of inheritance unless the father has acknowledged his paternity by a writ-
ing signed in the presence of a competent witness. 2 23 An illegitimate
child is, however, the heir of its deceased mother, 2 2 4 while an adopted
child of a deceased homesteader is his heir and lineal descendant for all
purposes. 2 2
5
The adopted child of a deceased lineal descendant is in a somewhat
doubtful position with respect to the ancestor of such lineal descendant.
An argument can, or could, be made, in the light of the liberal trend of the
recent statutes, that the Legislature intended to include such a child among
the heirs of its adopting parent's ancestor, but this contention has not
prevailed to date.
2 2 6
""FIA. STAT. §731.27 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"'FLA. STAT. §731.23 (Cum. Supp. 1947). Their absolute interest is of course
limited to the homesteader's estate, which may be less than the fee.
..FL. STAT. §731.25 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"2"Should our Supreme Court decide to give effect to the in terrorem clause,
however, a means of inducing relinquishment of homestead rights would exist; cf.
the discussion under Husband supra in this Part I, 1.
"'Shone v. Belmore, 75 Fla. 515, 78 So. 605 (1918).
... Cumberland & Liberty Mills v. Keggin, 139 Fla. 133, 190 So. 492 (1939);
Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931).
"'FA. STAT. §731.29 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"'Ibid.
22'FLA. STAT. §§72.22, 731.30 (Cum. Supp. 1947), construed as to an earlier statute,
almost identical, in Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931); see In re
Brock, 157 Fla. 291, 294, 25 So.2d 659, 661 (1946).
.. Ibid. In spite of any implications that one might be tempted to draw from
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Finally, it should be noted that under the per stirpes rule, which ap-
plies in Florida, a remote lineal descendant will become an heir of a de-
ceased ancestor only if the intervening persons in the chain of descent have
predeceased the ancestor.
2 27
Other Heirs. Lineal ascendants and collateral heirs, although they
may inherit the property of a decedent if he leaves no spouse or lineal
descendants surviving, 22 8 are guaranteed no part of a decedent's home-
stead. They will take the homestead accompanied by the exemption if
they succeed to the property 2 29 but the homesteader is free to will it away
from them; and if he does so the exemption perforce .comes to naught.
2 30
The fact that the lineal descendants or other heirs have reached their
majority does not alter the operation of the homestead law. The exemp-
tion and the property will pass to minor or adult heirs in precisely the
same mainer.2 31 The only requirement is that the property in question
be the homestead of the decedent at the time of his death.
An interesting question apparently not yet brought before the Court
is the degree of misconduct that will bar an heir from asserting his claim
to the homestead. It is clear that a wife who wilfully deserts her matri-
monial home will not be allowed, upon the death of her husband, to assert
any claim to the homestead; 23 2 and in this respect the Court has laid
down a stricter rule than is generally applied to the descent of other types
of property. An heir convicted of murdering the homesteader cannot
claim any interest in the homestead property.2 3 3 Whether or not less
the dictum In re Brock, supra note 225, the more generally accepted view is that
adoption statutes of this type do not extend the relationship for purposes of inheri-
tance beyond the adopting parent, for the reasons set forth In re Hewett's Estate,
153 Fla. 137, 13 So.2d 904 (1943), cited with approval In re Poole's Estate, 153
Fla. 610, 15 So.2d 323 (1943).
' FLA. STAT. §731.25 (Cum. Supp. 1947), Broward v. Broward, 96 Fla. 131,
117 So. 691 (1928).
28FLA. STAT. §§721.27, 731.23 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
-"'FLA. CoNsT. Art. X, §2; Hill v. First Nat. Bank of Marianna, 73 Fla. 1092,
75 So. 614 (1917); Johns v. Bowden, 68 Fla. 32, 66 So. 155 (1914).
"'FLA. CoNsr. Art. X, §4, Purnell v. Reed, 32 Fla. 329, 13 So. 874 (1893); see
Johns v. Bowden, 68 Fla. 32, 44, 66 So. 155, 158 (1914).
""Cumberland & Liberty Mills v. Keggin, 139 Fla. 133, 190 So. 492 (1939);
Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931); Miller v. Finegan, 26 Fla. 29,
7 So. 140 (1890).
'"Barlow v. Barlow, 156 Fla. 458, 23 So.2d 723 (1945); cf. note 76 supra.
"'FLA. STAT. §731.31 (Cum. Supp. 1947). It seems obvious that "estate" in
this statute includes homestead property. Less serious misconduct on the part of an
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serious misconduct will cut off an heir's claim to homestead property, as
it does in the case of a deserting wife, has not been decided in Florida;
but the current of authority in situations involving other classes of prop-
erty indicates that it would not.23 4 There is a sound social policy under-
lying this distinction between a wife and heirs. Wayward conduct on the
part of a wife strikes a far more serious blow at the very heart of the
family structure-that continuity of the home which the homestead law
is designed to preserve.
From the standpoint of subjection to administration and probate pro-
ceedings, a decedent's homestead is not a part of his estate. 23 5 This
distinction is important, not only in the matter of substantive rights but
also with regard to the jurisdictional and other procedural differences
thus occasioned, discussed in Part IV infra.
2. Intervivos Transfer of Homestead Realty
The only express restrictions placed by Florida law upon intervivos
transfer of homestead property are found in the following passages:
".. . and the real estate shall not be alienable without the joint con-
sent of husband and wife, when that relation exists."1
2 36 I
"Nothing in this Article shall be construed to prevent the holder of
a homestead from alienating his or her homestead so exempted by deed
or mortgage duly executed by himself or herself, and by husband and
wife, if such relation exists .... ,,287
These provisions lead to the conclusion that homestead realty may be
conveyed away during the life of its owner by either deed or mortgage
(1) provided that the instrument of conveyance be properly executed by
the owner of the homestead; and (2) provided further that, if the owner
have a husband or wife, the spouse consent to the transfer and exhibit
heir is not penalized by the Florida Probate Law.
2 .Early authorities were in conflict as to whether, in the absence of statute, an
heir who murdered his ancestor in order to convert his mere expectancy into a
vested interest was thereby barred from his inheritance; see RmPFk€x, WILLS AND
ADMTNISTRATION op ESTATES N FLORIDA 565 n. 30 (2d ed. 1946).
"'Spitzer v. Branning, 135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (1938), 139 Fla. 259, 190 So. 516
(1939); Baker v. State, 17 Fla. 406 (1879).
.'.FLA. CoNST. Art. X. §1.
'"FLA. CoxsT. Art. X, §4.
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that consent by joining in the execution of the deed or mortgage. These
constitutional provisions offer the advantages of brevity, reasonable clarity,
and flexibility in interpretation and enforcement. To combine such lin-
guistic virtues with the additional goal of propounding phraseology that
leaves no room for doubt in any factual situation is obviously impossible,
however; and, as might have been expected, the courts have found the
precise meaning of Article X questioned in a variety of circumstances.
Execution. The meaning of the words "duly executed," as applied to
the owner of the homestead, has caused no difficulty; the Supreme Court
has held that a deed or mortgage of homestead property is duly executed
when it complies with the statutory requisites for such instruments in
effect at the time of execution.2 38 Under the present law the usual deed
of homestead, like any other intervivos conveyance of "an estate or in-
terest of freehold, or for a term of more than one year, or any uncertain
interest of, in or out of" real property, must be evidenced by a writing
signed by the grantor in the presence of two subscribing witnesses.2 3 9
Question may arise as to the enforcement of an equitable mortgage
against homestead property. Section 697.01, Florida Statutes 1941, pro-
vides in effect that all instruments of writing conveying or selling prop-
erty for the purpose of securing a debt shall be regarded as mortgages;
and this statute has been applied to an absolute deed purporting to convey
homestead property. 2 40 The statute is simply a legislative adoption of a
well-established principle of equity, by which a mortgage is created, re-
gardless of the form of the instrument, whenever the transaction is in fact
a security device.2 4 ' To be sure, the statute does contemplate evidence
by a writing; but parol evidence is admissible to show the true nature
of the dealings between the interested parties.2 4 2
""New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 122 Fla. 540, 166 So. 269 (1935), remanded on
rehearing, 122 Fla. 565, 166 So. 279 (1936); Shad v. Smith, 74 Fla. 324, 76 So. 897
(1917).
sS9FLA. STAT. §689.01 (1941).
"'First Nat. Bank of Florida v. Ashmead, 33 Fla. 416, 14 So. 886 (1894), in
which case the wife joined in the execution of the absolute deed. FYA. STAT. §697.02
(1941) provides that a mortgage shall constitute a lien rather than a conveyance of
title or of the right to possession.
RE.g.: Torreyson v. Dutton, 145 Fla. 169, 198 So. 796 (1940); Vanderpool
Properties, Inc. v. Hess & Slager, Inc., 100 Fla. 933, 130 So. 457 (1930) ; Pittman v.
Milton, 69 Fla. 304, 68 So. 658 (1915); Connor v. Connor, 59 Fla. 467, 52 So. 727
(1910); Hull v. Burr, 58 Fla. 432, 50 So. 754 (1909).
"'First Nat. Bank of Florida v. Ashmead, 33 Fla. 416, 14 So. 886 (1894); as
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Although in some jurisdictions an equitable mortgage of realty has been
permitted to rest on a mere parol agreement accompanied by part perform-
ance, 2 43 enforcement of such a mortgage against Florida homestead prop-
erty in the normal course of events is unlikely. It is submitted that an
equitable mortgage of a homestead estate in realty necessitates either (1)
an obligation falling within the classes excepted by Section 1 of Article
X,244 or (2) creation in accordance with the requirements of joinder and
due execution. In each of the cases cited in note 241 supra a written instru-
ment was signed by the owner of the homestead, as well as by the spouse
of such owner whenever the relation of husband and wife existed. Never-
theless, provided a transaction itself can be accomplished by parol as a
matter of property law, there is no logical reason why parol consent
should not constitute due execution.
Since the Supreme Court of Florida has committed itself to the prin-
ciple that the homestead provisions apply to any interest that the head
of a family residing in Florida may have in his dwelling, 2 4 5 it is reason-
able to infer that leasehold interests for less than one year may be sub-
ject to the homestead laws and to assume that transfer of it least some
such interests, including consent thereto, may be effected by parol. 2 4 6
The same principle should apply in the case of other interests in land not
covered by the Statute of Frauds2 47 or by other enactments of the Leg-
islature. In the doubtful event that parol alienation should prove to be
undesirable in such instances, correction should be made by statute; the
judiciary should not be burdened with the task of excepting homestead
property, on grounds of policy, from the established rules of property law.
Joinder of Spouse. To enjoy exemption as a homestead, and to be sub-
ject to the restraints placed upon its alienation, the dwelling need not be
stated in Markell v. Hilpert, 140 Fla. 842, 855, 192 So. 392, 398 (1939), this is the
equity rule, quite apart from any statute.
2
11WA.SH, MORTGAGES 45-46 (1934); 1 JONES, MORTGAGES §227 (8th ed. 1928).
2"An equitable lien arising in part out of funds advanced without any writing and
used in purchasing homestead realty was allowed in Sonneman v. Tuszynski, 139 Fla.
824, 191 So. 18 (1939); see Porter v. Teate, 17 Fla. 813, 818 (1880) (dealing with
similar provisions of the Constitution of 1868) ; cf. the discussion of Purchase Obliga-
tions in Part I, 1 supra.
2"See Part 1, 4 supra.
2"6FLA. STAT. §689.01 (1941) requires a writing for only those terms of more
than one year. See FLA. STAT., C. 83 (1941) for effect of oral lease.
21
7 FLA. STAT. §689.01 (1941).
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owned by a married person. 2 48 A homesteader may convey or mortgage
the homestead by means of an instrument executed by himself or herself
alone if unmarried at the time; but when he or she does have a spouse, the
Constitution requires that such spouse join in the execution of a deed or
mortgage conveying or encumbering the property.2 4 9 The manner in
which the joinder of a spouse must be evidenced is, like the manner of
execution, determined by the law in effect at the time of alienation.25 o
The deed or mortgage should of course be signed by the spouse, and it is
also customary to mention the spouse in the body of the instrument as a
party to the transaction. Mere form, however, is not alone sufficient. The
language of Section 1 of Article X indicates that something more than a
mere form is contemplated. "Joint consent" of husband and wife is neces-
sary. Thus, while the execution of an instrument by a wife is prima facie
evidence of her joinder, 2 5 ' proof that the execution was not voluntary
obviously invalidates the instrument.2 5 2
Joinder by the husband is necessary in the alienation of homestead
property owned by his wife.2 53 The fact that the manner of joinder in
such a case has not been seriously questioned, however, indicates that
this phose of the matter is well understood. The alienation is effectual if
the husband consents to the transaction and demonstrates his consent by
signing the deed or mortgage. In so far as the body of the instrument is
concerned, joinder by a wife is accomplished in exactly the same manner
as joinder by a husband--consent evidenced by a voluntary signature;
but for a long time in Florida acknowledgment on the part of a man and
acknowledgment on the part of his wife were each governed by different
rules.
2'See Part I, 2 supra.
"'FLA. CoisT. Art. X, §§1, 4. These sections expressly require joinder when, and
only when, the owner of the homestead has a spouse. That the homesteader has
children or other dependents living with him is immaterial in this connection.
25°See note 238 supra.
"'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 122 Fla. 540, 555, 166 So. 269, 275 (1935).
This opinion of Whitfield, J., was approved on rehearing, 122 Fla. 565, 166 So. 279
(1936), as correctly stating the law. Ultimately, on the fifth appeal, a final decree
for the mortgagee was affirmed, 144 Fla. 744, 198 So. 681 (1940).
"'.Shad v. Smith, 74 Fla. 324, 76 So. 897 (1917); see New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Oates, 141 Fla. 164, 182, 192 So. 637, 645 (1939).
""FLA. CONST. Art. X, §4. The sex of the homesteader, who must be both the
owner and the family head, is immaterial; cf. Bigelow v. Dunphe, 144 Fla. 330, 198
So. 13 (1940).
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Acknowledgment. The general rule in Florida is that acknowledg-
ment by the person executing an instrument is necessary for purposes of
recordation only.2 5 4 Acknowledgment by a husband accordingly does not
affect the validity of the instrument; his valid execution is sufficient to
pass title to the property in question except as against subsequent credi-
tors and good-faith purchasers, who are protected by the recording act.2 5 5
Prior to the year 1943 not only were separate examination and
acknowledgment required of a wife not a free dealer2 5 6 in order -that a
deed be eligible for recording, but these steps were also treated as an
indispensable part of the transfer, regardless of whether the wife was
mortgaging her separate property 2 5 7 or relinquishing her dower rights,25 8
or joining in the alienation as a tenant by the entirety2 59 or as the spouse
of the owner of a homestead. 26 0 A deed signed by the wife but showing
no separate acknowledgment therefore failed to pass the wife's interest. 2 8 '
In 1943 the Legislature enacted a statute placing a married woman's
acknowledgment on the same footing as that of a single person and dis-
pensing with the requirement of a separate examination. 26 2 The last
section of this statute contains a curative clause validating all prior
acknowledgments taken in accordance with these provisions unless ques-
tioned in a court of competent jurisdiction within one year after May 13,
1943. There is no reason to question the prospective operation of this
statute; and although attacks from the constitutional angle against the
2 5 'FY.a. STAT. §695.01 (1941); Black v. Skinner Mfg. Co., 53 Fla. 1090, 43 So.
919 (1907); Licata v. de Corte, 50 Fla. 563, 39 So. 58 (1905).
2"Ibid.
...C. FLA. STAT. §62.27 (1941) ; today §§62.38 - 62.46 (Cum. Supp. 1947) prescribe
the procedure for becoming a free dealer.
257FLA. STAT. §693.03 (1941); see Pritchett v. New York Life Ins. Co., 125 Fla.
653, 665, 170 So. 700, 705 (1936).
"'FLA. STAT. §693.02 (1941), Foxworth v. Maddox, 103 Fla. 32, 137 So. 161
(1931).
... Newman v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 119 Fla. 641, 160 So. 745 (1935).
"'Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920); Shad v. Smith, 74 Fla.
324, 76 So. 897 (1917).
"One interesting distinction between a conveyance of homestead and of other
real property owned exclusively by a husband is that in the latter case non-joinder
or defective joinder by the wife renders the transaction ineffectual as to her dower
interest only, while in the former case the entire transaction is void.
...FLA. STAT. §693.03 (Cum. Supp. 1947). This enactment, effective May 13,
1943, was not considered in Berlin v. Jacobs, 156 Fla. 773, 24 So.2d 717 (1945),
with most confusing results from the standpoint of the practitioner; ci. Comment,
21 FLA. L. J. 216 (1947).
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retroactive implications of its curative clause are possible, this danger is
not of major proportions today.
2 63
On May 11, 1943, an act was passed, effective immediately, purport-
ing to authorize husband and wife to give powers of attorney to each
other, and when thus empowered to execute and acknowledge deeds to
property owned by either spouse separately or by both as tenants by the
entirety.2 6 4 On June 4 of the same year this provision was included as
Section 2 of a broader statute,2 65 which, however, provided in Section 3
that it was not to be construed as "dispensing with the joinder of husband
and wife in conveying or mortgaging homestead property." The limita-
tion was recognized in Jacobs v. Berlin2 66 as an essential step in uphold-
ing a decree of the chancellor denying enforcement of specific perform-
ance of a contract executed by a married woman alone to convey realty
that was in part homestead.
3. The Supreme Court Rules of Descent
Second to only the Supreme Court Rules of Practice are the Supreme
Court rules of descent, as far as the practitioner is concerned. The Con-
stitution itself places but one limitation on the alienation of the homestead
while its owner is alive, namely, that whenever he or she has a spouse the
joint consent of both, and due execution by both, are required.2 6 7 Dis-
position by will is forbidden by the Constitution in a backhanded manner
unless the homesteader is "without children,"2 6 8 while devise so as to cut
off either his "lineal descendants" or his wife is checkmated by sta-
"'Detailed discussion of this matter is outside the scope of this article; see
generally FxA. CONsr. Art. IM, §33; Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 154 Fla.
710, 18 So.2d 775 (1944) ; Campbell v. Home, 147 Fla. 523, 3 So.2d 125 (1941) ; Lee
v. Lang, 140 Fla. 782, 192 So. 490 (1939); Rogers, Florida Curative Statutes, 22
FrA. L. J. 153 (1948).
"FIA. STAT. §708.09 (Cum. Supp. 1947), passed as c. 21696, §1, of Fla. Laws 1943.
23FLA. STAT. §§708.08-708.10 (Cum. Supp. 1947), enacted as Fla. Laws 1943, c.
21932; see Comment, 1 U. or FLA. L. Rav. 108 (1948), as to conveyance of home-
steads held by the entirety.
"'158 Fla. 259, 28 So.2d 539 (1946). The reasons given in this opinion explain
correctly for the first time the practical result reached by inadvertence in Berlin v.
Jacobs, 156 Fla. 773, 24 So.2d 717 (1945); cf. note 262 supra. Apparently the
decisive issue of fact, namely, the homestead character of a portion of the property
involved, was not raised by counsel at the outset.
"'Art. X, §1 (consent), §4 (execution).
'aFLA. CoNsT. Art. X, §4.
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tute. 2 6 9 "The exemptions . . .shall inure to the widow and heirs,"'2 70
provided any property passes to them; but nowhere does the Constitution
prescribe that any property must pass. What the electorate chose not to
prescribe, however, the bench has supplied-by a process as clever as it
was gradual, and at least as dubious as devious. 2 7 1
Early History. In 1897 Mr. Chief Justice Taylor, after analyzing the
previous leading cases, concluded that they
2 7 2
".. . settled the doctrine in Florida that the homestead provisions
of our Constitution do not undertake to cast an estate in the exempted
properties upon the widow or heirs . .. ."
Some seven years later he succinctly stated the law as follows:
2 7 3
...FLA. STAT. §§731.05, 731.27; cf. §731.34 (Cum. Supp. 1947); see note 189 supra.
'"FLA. CONST. Art. X, §2.
...A searching criticism of this judicial transmutation, even today unanswered from
the standpoint of logic, is found in Tribble, Homestead Law in Florida as a Restraint
of Alienation, 5 FLA. L. J. 37 (1931).
""Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 347, 22 So. 687, 692 (1897). Although the decision
turned on the authority to will homestead personalty, the relationship between per-
sonalty and realty was carefully dissected. Speaking of the provisions governing
both the realty and personalty exemptions, the opinion, immediately after the pas-
sage quoted above, continued:
".. . or to regulate or establish their rights of property inheritance therein, but
that such rights must be ascertained from other sources, viz: The statutes regu-
lating dower and the laws of descent, but that all that inures to the widow and
heirs under the second section quoted from the Constitution is the right to
exempt the property from forced sale for the debts of the deceased head of the
family. The widow and heirs, on the death of the pater familias, acquire their
proprietary rights of property in the things exempted, not from the constitu-
tional provisions quoted, but entirely from the statutes regulating dower and the
descent of property, unaffected by such constitutional provisions, except that the
latter instrument appends to the things exempted, in their transmission to the
widow and heirs, the feature of immunity from forced sale for the debts of the
ancestor."
In Claflin v. Ambrose, 37 Fla. 78, 88, 19 So. 628, 631 (1896), conveyance of the
homestead by husband and wife to the wife via a third party, without consideration,
was held not to constitute fraud on his creditors. In dismissing their bill the Court
sustained the conveyance, but unfortunately the question of the claims of heirs, if
any, did not arise. Noteworthy general analyses are listed in note 180 supra.
... Palmer v. Palmer, 47 Fla. 200, 204, 35 So. 983, 985 (1904).
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"The effect of the constitution of 1885 in so far as the homestead
is concerned, where the relation of husband and wife exists, and where
there is a child or children, is to compel such homestead to inure to
the widow as widow, and to the heirs, unless the consent of the wife
can be obtained to its alienation in the lifetime of the husband, and
where such alienation does not take place, compels intestacy so far
as such homestead is concerned by prohibiting its alienation by will."
His summaries were strictly accurate at that time, and the Constitu-
tion has not been altered one iota since then as far as these provisions are
concerned. The law, however, has been radically changed.
To be sure, the decisions themselves continued on a sound basis for
many years. They involved either attempts at conveyance between hus-
'band and wife without the due execution by both expressly required by
the plain English of Section 4 of Article X,274 or purported dispositions,
in fact testamentary but feebly disguised as intervivos conveyances. 27 5
The costume for the new principle, which finally appeared in full dress in
"'E.g., Thomas v. Craft, 55 Fla. 842, 46 So. 594 (1908). This was followed by
Byrd v. Byrd, 73 Fla. 322, 74 So. 313 (1917), Jahn v. Purvis, 145 Fla. 354, 190
So. 340 (1940), and Estep v. Herring, 154 Fh 653, 18 So.2d 683 (1944); in this
last case the direct conveyance of real estate from husband alone to wife, allegedly
made pursuant to FLA. STAT. §689.11 (1941), was invalidated as to homestead realty.
The 1947 amendment to this section (Cum. Supp. 1947), discussed in Note, 1 U. oF
FLA. L. REv. 433 (1948), is still governed by this holding, inasmuch as the Constitu-
tion cannot be changed by statute even expressly, much less by mere implication.
The decisions upholding conveyance from husband alone to wife have rested on the
factual finding below of abandonment of the property as the home prior to con-
veyance. E.g.: Knowlton v. Dean 31 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1941), discussed in Comment,
1 U. op FLA. L. REv. 108 (1948) ; Lanier v. Lanier, 95 Fla. 522, 116 So. 867 (1928) ;
Semple v. Semple, 82 Fla. 138, 89 So. 638 (1921); Rawlins v. Dade Lumber Co.,
80 Fla. 398, 86 So. 334 (1920) (alternatively decision was based on consideration
moving from wife plus absence of fraud, the attack on her title coming from creditors
of ex-husband, who had conveyed homestead to her just before divorce and well
prior to judgment for creditors).
"'One such type, identified by failure to deliver the deed until the death of the
grantor, was denuded in Norton v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1, 102 So. 361 (1924); another,
characterized by reservation of the beneficial interest and power to revoke, came
to grief in Johns v. Bowden, 68 Fla. 32, 66 So. 155 (1914), in which the alleged
conveyance was judicially termed a testamentary disposition and the cause was
remanded for determination as to whether the trustor was in fact the head of a
family upon his death following that of his wife. He was later found not to be,
72 Fla. 530, 73 So. 603 (1916).
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Church v. Lee,2 7 6 was carefully fabricated piece by piece in a series of
dicta confusing the perch with our chameleon, that is, the homestead
property with the homestead exemption, and gradually building up the
impression that whenever a chameleon might conceivably appear a perch
on which he could rest had to be furnished in order to comply with the dic-
tates of organic law.
Consideration and Voluntary Transfer. Until the third decade of the
century the sailing in homestead waters was reasonably clear. No one
questioned the necessity of joinder by the wife in consenting to and execut-
ing a conveyance of the homestead, even when she was the transferee.
2 7 7
And after Palmer v. Palmer2 7 8 there was no doubt as to the inability of a
testator to devise his homestead realty when he left children surviving.
That these two principles could be connected, however, was not realized.
until the doctrine of consideration was brought into the picture, in aid of
the carefully nurtured fusion, or rather confusion, of the homestead prop-
erty and the homestead exemption.
In Hutchinson v. Stoe 2 7 9 Mr. Justice Whitfield, speaking for the
full Supreme Court, begins to develop the notion that the "exempt prop-
erty is for the benefit of the 'heirs' as well as of the 'widow' of the owner."
Within four months, in sustaining a conveyance to the childless wife by
the husband alone in Rawlins v. Dade Lumber Co.,280 he inserts the
dictum that the inurement of the exemption constitutes the "reason" for
the rule that "when there are children or a child of the husband a convey-
ance of homestead real estate to the wife by the husband alone is void
under the Constitution . .. " Of course, the obvious reason for requiring
joinder of the spouses is that the Constitution specifically says so, prosaic
though such a simple explanation may sound. Conveyance by the hus-
band alone is forbidden regardless of whether his heir apparent is a son
or only a beloved aunt. It might be added that the actual decision in the
"6e102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931).
""See note 274 supra.
'847 Fla. 200, 35 So. 983 (1904). He must, of course, be the head of a family
in order to qualify as a homesteader; see Part I, 2 supra.
2779 Fla. 157, 165, 84 So. 151, 153 (1920) (mortgage of homestead not a valid
alienation unless acknowledged by wife pursuant to statute then in effect).
28080 Fla. 398, 403, 86 So. 334, 336 (1920) (conveyance of homestead to wife by
husband alone held valid when he had left her permanently and was not residing
on the homestead when he executed the deed).
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case correctly rests on abandonment of the homestead by the husband.28 l
The dissent of Mr. Justice Whitfield in Semple v. Semple2 s 2 refers to the
existence of children in Byrd v. Byrd,283 as contrasted with the Rawlins
case. Once again the real issue was abandonment rather than the exist-
ence of offspring, but his dissent concludes with a passage emphasizing the
presence of a child.284
In his concurring opinion in Norton v. Baya the transmutation takes
on more definite form by proscribing a "voluntary" conveyance,2
85
especially when the following passage is examined:
28 6
"The children of the owner who are his statutory 'heirs,' have a
right and an interest in the homestead real estate exemptions that are
secured by the Constitution, and the owner cannot transfer the prop-
erty to another except by the alienation that is expressly provided for
in which the wife must join. And the joint deed or mortgage of hus-
band and wife required by the Constitution, necessarily contemplates
an alienation to others than the wife, at least where the conveyance to
her is without consideration and there are children to whom as heirs
together with the widow the exemption by the express terms of the
Constitution, 'shall inure' at the death of the owner."
In Jackson v. Jackson2 07 the Court was again confronted with a so-
called voluntary transfer by both parents to a third party, who had in
turn conveyed to the wife without consideration. In this case, for the first
time, the issue of failure to deliver the deeds played no part in the opin-
ion; no attempt was made to call them a mere testamentary transfer in
fact. Nevertheless the Court unanimously affirmed their cancellation;
and the opinion, again by Mr. Justice Whitfield, lays down the following
principle:2 8 8
"The transaction in this case does not constitute 'such an aliena-
"Whlfiel, J., admits this himself in Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710, 716, 182
So. 903, 905 (1938). As to what constitutes abandonment see Part 1, 5 supra.
2B28 2 Fla. 138, 145, 89 So. 638, 640 (1921).
11173 Fla. 322, 74 So. 313 (1917).
28'82 Fla. 138, 148, 89 So. 638, 641 (1921).
"'88 Fla. 1, 10, 102 So. 361, 364 (1924).
2Id. at 11, 102 So. at 364.
"190 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1926).
"'Id. at 569, 107 So. at 257.
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tion of the homestead as is required by the Constitution to accomplish
that result. If given effect it would operate to transfer the legal title
to the homestead from the husband to the wife, stripped of its home-
stead status or character, thereby converting her interest therein into
absolute ownership, and divest his children, who are his pros-
pective heirs, of the interest which under the Constitution, inures to
them. This is so because the homestead must be owned by the head
of the family and the exemption inure to his widow and heirs."
In spite of the cases cited in support of this view, a new concept here
makes its way into Florida law. Our little chameleon, which less than
twenty years before was only a gleam in the eye of our famous justice,
has grown from a mere expectancy of exemption, on through the adoles-
cent period of contingent remainder, sometimes in the exemption but grad-
ually in the property, until now he becomes a full-fledged estate, a sort
of vested remainder in the property, defeasible under certain conditions
only. 289 To the constitutional lawyer he may seem rather misshapen,
and to the property lawyer he is no doubt a monstrosity, but at all events
he is with us.
The stage is now set for the inevitable climax. The law professes to
abhor fictions until popular desire for a different practical result de-
mands recognition, whereupon some cloak must be produced to square the
change with the time-honored theory of static rules, the doctrine that
judges never make law-they merely apply it.290 The evil straw-man of
Norton v. Baya and Jackson v. Jackson 291 can now be removed from
the cast, and in the final scene the due alienation by husband and wife
together, specifically authorized by Section 4 of Article X, is defeated
in single combat by our hero, lack of consideration, with those ringing
lines reminiscent of Daniel Webster: 292
...The extreme to which this misconception has gone is well illustrated by the
following sentence from the dissent in Miller v. Mobley, 136 Fla. 351, 355, 186 So.
797, 799 (1939): "Section 2 of Article 10 of the constitution of Florida provides that
the homestead shall inure . . ." The exemption has become lost in the shuffle.
'" 0For a realistic analysis of the judicial mind at work see Jerome Frank, A Sketch
of an Influence, Max Rheinstein, Who Watches the Watchmen, and Carlos Cossio,
Phenomenology of the Judgment, in INTERPRETATIONS or MODFRN LE:AL PHxLOsoPm1r
189, 589, 85 (Sayre ed. 1947), reviewed in 1 U. or Fr.A. L. REv. 111 (1948).
9138 Fla. 1, 102 So. 361 (1924), and 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925), respectively.
... Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 486, 136 So. 242, 246 (1931) (holding for the
first time that a duly executed conveyance by husband and wife direct to the wife,
without consideration, is void when there are children).
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".... if an act is not permitted to be done indirectly it follows that it may
not be done directly."
This judicial conversion of a constitutional exemption from forced
sale into a rule of descent has been vigorously attacked right up to the
present time, but with little or no success. Nor has it mattered whether
the conveyence was direct to the wife2 93 or via a straw-man.
2 9 4
How, then, can the head of a family avoid this rule of descent? For
one thing, he and his wife can take the property as an estate by the
entirety, provided they do so deliberately at the outset, before the head
of the family has the misfortune to acquire the homestead in his own
name. One would have expected to find this also condemned as a patent
conspiracy to circumvent organic law, but the Supreme Court has balked
at pushing its brainchild to a logical conclusion.2 9 5 Again, the home-
stead can be abandoned, in which event the head of the family can dis-
pose of it without hindrance from our "constitutional" law of descent.2 98
2031bid.
"'Florida Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Winn, 158 Fla. 750, 30 So.2d 298 (1947);
McEwen v. Larson, 136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866 (1939); Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710,
182 So. 903 (1938) ; Bess v. Anderson, 102 Fla. 1127, 136 So. 898 (1931) ; Hart v. Gulf
Fertilizer Co., 91 Fla. 991, 108 So. 886 (1926).
"0'Knapp v. Fredricksen, 148 Fla. 311, 4 So.2d 251 (1941); Menendez v. Rodri-
guez, 106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932). In the latter case the facts include transfers
through a third party from husband to wife, and later from the wife via a third
party to husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, shortly before the lot was
rendered homestead by construction of their home thereon; obviously the sole purpose
of this double shuffle was to insulate the second Mrs. Rodriguez from any possible
descent claims by the children of her husband's first marriage, but the process received
judicial blessing. See Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710, 714, 182 So. 903, 905 (1938),
in which the line is clearly drawn.
"In Miller v. Mobley, 136 Fla. 351, 186 So. 797 (1939), the Menendez v. Rodri-
guez maneuver described in the preceding footnote was again pulled off in favor of
the second wife, this time by selling the home for 34 months and then buying it
back, largely by canceling the original purchase-money mortgage and notes (Chapman
and Whitfield, J. J., dissenting). Prior to legal separation, in Jordan v. Jordan,
100 Fla. 1586, 132 So. 466 (1931), the departure of the second wife from the home-
stead, leaving her husband alone long enough to enable him to convey the home via
a straw-man to himself and her as tenants by the entirety while he was not the head
of any family, was unanimously held sufficient to cut off all homestead claims of
his children by a former marriage. Following the transfer she returned to the
apartment house, although according to the opinion marital relations were not
resumed. Still another type of abandonment appears in Anderson Mill and Lumber
Co. v. Clements, 101 Fla. 523, 134 So. 588 (1931).
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Or the homesteader and spouse may prefer to deed it outright to some
of their children for a consideration, reserving as grantors a life estate.
29 7
Finally, of course, the spouses may simply sell the homestead, in which
event it has been stated by way of dictum that "the consideration takes
the place of the exempted property and the Constitution may not there-
by be violated." 2 9 8  Limited to nothing more than a pious hope that
somehow the children will receive some benefit from the proceeds of the
sale, this remark is accurate, though not of profound significance; but
if construed to mean that the exemptions attaching to homestead realty
follow the personalty derived from its sale, the statement is definitely
misleading as regards both descent and exemption from forced sale. Only
in exceptional instances does personalty step into the shoes of the realty
from which it is derived. 29 9
Article X specifically distinguishes between realty and personalty in
creating the exemptions, and the personalty exemption is expressly limited
to $1,000. And, as we shall see in Part III, there are no constitutional
restrictions on bequests of homestead personalty. The true principle of
law is that, once homestead realty is duly alienated during the life of its
owner, any proceeds other than real property received in exchange are
obviously personalty, and are governed entirely by the homestead pro-
visions relating to personalty.
The foregoing exposition of the method by which the judicial rules
of homestead descent were established admittedly does not prove that the
results are necessarily unfortunate or unwanted. Basically, the issue
involves a determination as to whether the homestead provisions are de-
signed primarily to enable the family breadwinner to continue to win
bread, or whether they aim at another major objective, namely, to keep
family property in the family from generation to generation.3 0 0 On
principle, however, these rigid restrictions are difficult to justify. Unlike
...Daniels v. Mercer, 105 Fla. 362, 141 So. 189 (1932) (direct conveyance), fol-
lowed in Parrish v. Robbirds, 146 Fla. 324, 200 So. 925 (1941), and Jones v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 126 Fla. 527, 171 So. 317 (1936) (alternative hold-
ing; also, conveyance was via third party). In the first two cases mentioned con-
sideration was found; in the third it was overlooked, but the decision does not
necessarily eliminate the necessity for consideration.
... Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710, 716, 182 So. 903, 905 (1938).
'9 E.g., Kohn v. Coats, 103 Fla. 264, 138 So. 760 (1931) (fire insurance proceeds).
""As has just been noted, their efficacy in the latter event is seriously impaired
by the use of the estate by the entirety, the doctrine of abandonment, and the lack
of any constitutional restraint on testamentary disposition of homestead personalty.
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the disposition of the estate of a decedent, which the Legislature may
freely control, 30 1 the ownership of property by a living person com-
prehends an inherent right to manage and transfer that property.
3 0 2
Ownership is of course subject to the overriding needs of the society pos-
sessing jurisdiction of the property, but the judiciary should not lightly
tamper with the right of an individual to alienate his property unless
the necessity for restraint is made clear by constitutional or statutory
provisions or by unequivocally expressed demands of public policy.
The fact remains that neither by the Florida Constitution nor by the
acts of the Legislature is a voluntary transfer of homestead property
expressly prohibited. Instead, the Constitution provides protection for
the family by requiring the spouse of the homesteader to join in the
execution of a deed or mortgage alienating the homestead. This im-
portant phase of the family welfare is left, as the framers of the Con-
sitution obviously intended it should be, to the joint discretion of those
who create the family. To circumscribe this discretion arbitrarily has
quite the reverse of a beneficial effect on the family itself, in spite of
the admitted fact that in the odd instance judicial condemnation has
proved an effective means of forestalling a designing second wife seised
of a husband whose chief virtue appears to be docility. The burden of
ever-increasing taxation on the family as a whole is often relieved by a
timely transfer of the homestead; and a widow may well live in misery
under an expensive family roof, the grandeur of which vanishes with her
husband.3 0 3 In the final analysis, these conflicting policies are belst
sorted by the electorate or by the legislature; the function is not one to
be assumed by the bench.
An encouraging note was struck recently in the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Terrell, joined by Mr. Justice Chapman, in Florida National
Bank of Jacksonville v. Winn, presenting for the first time in many years
a realistic analysis of what was prescribed when the Constitution was
adopted: 3 04
"This court is committed to the doctrine that these provisions
of the Constitution permit alienation of the homestead by deed or
-01See note 181 supra.
"'In Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687 (1897), although the decision has
been distinguished in later homestead discussions on the ground that it deals with
personal property, this generally recognized principle is clearly expounded.
3 .g., Cowdery v. Herring, 106 Fla. 567, 143 So. 433 (1932).
30'158 Fla. 750, 752, 30 So.2d 298, 299 (1947). The decision permitted an adult
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mortgage; that parents without children may dispose of it by will,
but if they have children, minors or adults, they may not dispose of
it by will, neither may they dispose of it through a conduit or other-
wise without consideration. Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107
So. 255. Nor may a man with wife or child surviving him make tes-
tamentary disposition of the homestead. Norton v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1,
102 So. 361.
"In my view there have been unwarranted inferences drawn
from these and other decisions affecting the homestead. Certainly
the homestead was designed for the benefit of the family, to preserve
its finest traditions, but the constitution imposes only two limita-
tions on its preservation; (1) Exemption from forced sale under pro-
cess of any court, and (2) Alienation by joint consent of husband and
wife if that relation exists."
Even so, however, this statement admits that the Supreme Court rules
of descent remain in full force as applied to a voluntary conveyance from
both spouses to the wife. In the language of laymen, the exemption is,
at the outset, merely the tail on the dog; and obviously there can be no
tail without a dog. By concentrating on the tail, one then easily slides
into the notion that there can be no dog without a tail. Once this false
daughter, married and living apart for over twenty years, to burke a conveyance of
the homestead by her widowed father and his second wife to the wife via a third party,
followed by her promised devise thereof to the City of Cocoa for a public ulse.
Terrell, J., continued:
"There is no suggestion here that the alienation by the Taylors was irregular
or done for a fraudulent purpose. The Constitution does not require consideration
as a basis of alienation of the homestead. This idea was doubtless injected into
some of the decisions because of fraud or overreaching; otherwise it was mere
surplusage and has no application here. There is not a word in the Constitution
to warrant the suggestion that an adult child may thwart the desire of a parent
in the matter of disposing of the homestead by deed. The Constitution imposes
no limitation whatever on alienation and this court should impose none unless
the purpose of the homestead is about to he overthrown. The fact that exemption
from forced sale may inure to the widow and heirs imposes no restraint on
alienation.
"The makers of the constitution did not know much about formal ethics but
they knew their own mind and ruled their own household. It is contrary to all
human experience to contend that they wrote anything in the constitution that
would warrant one in thinking that a child long departed from the family tree
might return and thwart a transaction made like this in good faith. They were
not a breed that subscribed to junior rule."
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step in taken, the rest is simple. Since the tail and the dog are insep-
arable, therefore, wherever a tail might appear by inurement, there must
be a dog on which to hang it. The result is that the tail wags the dog.
Today the one remedy, unless numerous precedents can be over-
ruled, is the adoption of a constitutional amendment by the citizens of
Florida, restating what they set forth in 1885, but so worded as to dem-
onstrate clearly that they are creating an exemption from forced sale
and not enacting by implication a rule of succession.
PART III-EXEMTTION AND TRANs R Or HOMESTEAD PERSONALTY
1. Exemption from Forced Sale
In addition to the exemption from forced. sale of realty and the im-
provements thereon, Section I of Article X of the Florida Constitution
creates a personalty exemption. The pertinent language is "together
with one thousand dollars worth of personal property ... " At the outset
it should be noted that the words "together with" do not mean "together
with" at all; our chameleon can find adequate footing on personalty alone,
and the lack of real property does not bar an exemption of the person-
alty.305
What constitutes personalty is admittedly not a simple problem, but
it does not rest on any special characterization peculiar to the law of
homesteads. Rather recently "paintings, etchings, statutory [sic], rugs,
draperies, silverware, china, linens, and furniture" were categorized as
personalty.30 In arriving at the $1,000 limit, "cash, furnishings, or any
other personalty" 3 0 7 should be included in the inventory, including money
and choses in action.3 08 Even issuance of a cashier's check, provided pay-
ment be stopped, does not prevent exemption of credit in the bank.30 9
Products of land on the land, to be sure, follow the land, and a lessee
""Seashole v. O'Shields, 139 Fla. 839, 191 So. 74 (1939) ; Sneed v. Davis, 135 Fla.
271, 274, 184 So. 865, 867 (1938) (allegation of ownership of "no property of value
other than the stock in question" upheld as a valid defense against creditors; "prop-
erty" of course includes realty as well as personalty).
"'Richards v. Byrnes, 153 Fla. 705, 707, 15 So.2d 610 (1943). "Statutory" is
an obvious misprint for "statuary." The question was certified to the Supreme Court
as one without precedent, pursuant to Rule 38 of the Supreme Court Rules of
Practice.
°'Id. at 707, 15 So.2d at 611.
"'FLA. STAT. §222.06 (1941).
"'Tracy v. Lucik, 138 Fla. 188, 189 So. 430 (1939).
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cannot claim them as personalty; 31 0 for the same reason they descend
as homestead realty rather than as personalty. 3 1 '
Since, however, the personalty exemption created by Section I of
Article X does not bar the Legislature from creating other exemptions,
the proceeds and cash surrender values of life insurance policies are sep-
arately placed beyond the reach of creditors of the insured unless ef-
fected specifically for their benefit; 3 12 and as of June 9, 1941, this pro-
tection was extended to disability income benefits accruing from any form
of insurance.313  Constitutional objections to these statutes have been
firmly rejected. 3 14
The freedom from garnishment or attachment of "any money or
other thing due to any person who is the head of a family residing in this
state" for labor or services 31 5 has been held by an equally divided Supreme
Court, 3 -1 affirming judgment below, to embrace salaries of "white-collar"
workers, with the dissent bowing graciously to the insidious philosophy,
palmed off in the United States during the past fifteen years, that the only
person that renders services is one who uses his hands and his back al-
most exclusively and his head as little as possible.
Specific personalty can be mortgaged, for reasons thoroughly ex-
pounded in Patterson v. Taylor, 317 but a blanket waiver of the benefit
of any law was flatly declared a nullity as against the homestead exemp-
tion as far back as 1884.318 Both decisions stand unquestioned to-
day.3 1
9
"'Hodges v. Cooksey, 33 Fla. 715, 15 So. 549 (1894); Cathcart v. Turner, 18
Fla. 837 (1882) ; see Howard v. Calhoun, 155 Fla. 689, 693, 21 So.2d 361, 363 (1945) ;
Schofield v. Liody, 35 Fla. 1, 2, 16 So. 780 (1895); as regards liens on agricultural
products raised by a tenant today see FLA. STAT. §§83.08-83.11 (1941).
"'Adams v. Adams, 158 Fla. 173, 28 So.2d 254 (1946). Note, however, the
holding in Gentile Bros., Inc. v. Bryan, 101 Fla. 233, 133 So. 630 (1931), that a
specific mortgage of fruit crops produced by cultivation of homestead groves is not
an alienation of realty, and joinder of the spouse is not required.
"'FLA. STAT. §§222.13, 222.14 (1941). An excellent recent discussion, by one
who knows Florida law, appears in the opinion of Waller, Circ. J., in New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Valz, 141 F.2d 1014 (C. C. A. 5th 1944).
"'FLA. STAT. §222.18 (1941).
"'Milam v. Davis, 97 Fla. 916, 984, 123 So. 668, 692 (1929) ; cert. denied sub nom.
Tiffany & Co. v. Davis, 280 U. S. 601 (1929).
Sx FLA. STAT. §222.11 (1941).
..'Wolf v. Commander, 137 Fla. 313, 188 So. 83 (1939).
"..15 Fla. 336 (1875).
"'Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558 (1884).
.. E.g., Richardson v. Myers, 106 Fla. 136, 143 So. 157 (1932) (chatteL mortgage
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Apart from mortgage liens and judgment liens, however, there re-
mains the problem of statutory liens. The lien of a landlord for un-
paid rent was recently considered in Howard v. Calhoun.3 20 A ma-
jority held premature an action brought by the absent tenant to replevy
furniture, when it was commenced within three months of his departure
from the apartment, specifically because the landlord had not resorted
to forced sale and was permitted by statute to hold the furniture for
three months. If limited strictly to the facts, the decision itself may per-
haps be tenable, even though it avoids by only the narrowest of margins
a collision with the unanimous refusal to limit the exemption to pro-
tection against formal and technical process alone, as enunciated in
West Florida Grocery Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co. 321
Long ago, in the interpretation of Chapter 3131 of the Acts of 1879,
our Supreme Court soundly decided the issue of substantive law neces-
sarily involved in sanctioning the sale of personal effects, in spite of
the exemption, merely to collect hotel and apartment rentals. This co-
gent reasoning in Hodges v. Cooksey is accordingly quoted:3
2 2
"If the Legislature can declare a lien in favor of the landlord
for his rent on all the property of his tenarit other than agricultural
products, and it follows that by entering into the rental contract
alone the tenant thereby pledges his property to pay such claim and
waives his constitutional right of exemption therein, then it seems
to us that the Legislature can by providing similar liens to secure
the payment of other debts avoid and annul not only the policy but
the plain provisions of the Constitution on the subject of exemptions.
Food and raiment are as essential to life as a habitation and shelter,
and we might find insurmountable difficulty in discriminating against
the lien for one class of demands in favor of the other. The claim
for rent was highly favored at the common law, but we are unable
to discover any purpose in the Constitution to except this demand
from those against which the exemptions provided for may be claimed.
of specified homestead personalty held enforceable); Lowe v. Keith, 138 Fla. 694, 190
So. 67 (1939) (blanket waiver held ineffective to destroy exemption).
155 Fla. 689, 21 So.2d 361 (1945), construing FLA. STAT. §§85.19, 86.02 (1941)
in relation to FzA. CoxsI-. Art. X.
2174 Fla. 220, 77 So. 209 (1917).
8-1233 Fla. 715, 723, 15 So. 549, 552 (1894), followed in Schofield v. Liody, 35
Fl. 1, 16 So. 780 (1895).
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The Constitution exempts to the person entitled thereto one thou-
sand dollars' worth of personal property from forced sale under any
process of law, and the Legislature cannot indirectly deprive him
of such right any more than it can directly do it."
The forceful dissent of Mr. Justice Adams, 3 23 in which Mr. Justice
Buford joined, shows that the danger did not pass unnoticed in the
Howard case. A piece of movable furniture is by no stretch of the imagi-
nation a fructus of the hotel or apartment in which it happens to be placed.
Political scientists might within reason contend that the basic theory of
homesteads is unwise; but to permit special favoritism to landlords alone,
in the teeth of the express language of Section 1 of Article X, can fol-
low only from disregard of the elementary principle of the superiority
of constitutions over statutes. In practical effect the Howard decision
permits any group of creditors able to exert the necessary pressure on the
Legislature to rewrite the homestead provisions of the Constitution at
will.
The homestead personalty exemption is not to be confused with per-
sonalty in the form of cash that in reality takes the place of exempt real
property, whether the substitution be occasioned by destruction, 3 2 4 or
by sale of the realty of a deceased homesteader in appropriate circum-
...155 Fla. 689, 696, 21 So.2d 361, 365 (1945).
.. Kohn v. Coats, 103 Fla. 264, 138 So. 760 (1931). But cf. West Florida Grocery
Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 77 So. 209 (1917), in which these pro-
ceeds are regarded as personalty. The distinction made little practical difference in
view of the amount involved, and the point was not carefully considered. Kohn v.
Coats, supra, decides the issue squarely; the proceeds are clothed with the exemption
of the destroyed realty. Lest one be lulled into a false sense of security as regards
policies placed with insurers outside Florida, however, the warning contained in
Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U. S. 190 (1934), should not be neglected.
The Illinois corporate creditor of Sanders, a Texas homesteader, garnished the
Connecticut insurers in Illinois; and their subsequent interpleader proceedings in a
federal district court in Texas resulted ultimately in a decree there devoting the
insurance proceeds to payment of the Illinois default judgment obtained by Armour
in spite of an injunction of the Texas court forbidding continuance of the Illinois
attachment proceedings. Both the majority opinion and that of the four dissenters
are a bit on the foggy side, but the significant factor is that such a decision can be
reached only by holding that the Texas homestead exemption is procedural rather
than substantive and accordingly need not be recognized elsewhere if contrary to the
law of the forum.
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stances, 325 or in the form of damages for trespass upon realty.3 2 8 In
these instances the $1,000 limit does not apply, because the cash is realty
in the eye of the law.
Procedurally, the statutes provide a method whereby a debtor may
submit an inventory of all his personal property and then select a por-
tion thereof for purposes of exemption; in the event of dispute between
him and his creditor, appraisal follows. These provisions are well drafted,
and accordingly their mechanics require no discussion here.8
27 It is
settled that a bankrupt homesteader may schedule as exempt such
of his property as is free of lien rather than encumbered items.328
Obviously, to avail oneself of the authorized exemption does not deprive
creditors of any rights.
This is not to say, however, that transfers in fraud of creditors and
concealment of assets are condoned; in such instances the courts regard
the items unaccounted for as assets still within the control of the bank-
rupt.3 2 9 His selection of these as exempt is implied, and his total au-
thorized exemption is pro tanto reduced. Alleged concealment must be
demonstrated, of course; and in any event the total value of the prop-
erty listed, plus that of the items unlisted but later discovered, must
3'This is well brought out by Mabry, J., in Scull v. Beatty, 27 Fla. 426, 435,
9 So. 4, 6 (1891) (surplus from sale of homestead to satisfy mortgage upon death
of mortgagor held not subject to disposition as personalty). A different though
logically related situation is seen in Donly v. Metropolitan Realty & Inv. Co., 71 Fla.
644, 72 So. 178 (1916) (authorizing judicial sale of homestead realty and partition
of proceeds among heirs).
"'In Hill v. First Nat. Bank of Marianna, 79 Fla. 391, 397, 84 So. 190, 192 (1920),
our Supreme Court having forbidden execution of a judgment that was not a lien
on homestead property, refused to allow this judgment to he set off against damages
awarded for invasion of the homestead rights by the defendant bank, the gist of the
opinion being:
"The actual damage sustained by her because of the injury suffered as a result
of the trespass by defendants upon the exempt real property and the conversion by
them of the exempt personalty, and the judgment recovered therefor partake of
the nature of the homestead property and are also exempt."
M8'FLA. STAT. §§222.06-222.10 (1941); cf. §222.12 as to attachment bf "money or
other thing due ... for the personal labor or services" of the head of the family.
"Lowe v. Keith, 138 Fla. 654, 190 So. 67 (1939); Florida Loan & Trust Co. v.
Crabb, 45 Fla. 306, 33 So. 523 (1903); McMichael v. Eckman, 26 Fla. 43, 7 So. 366
(1890).
'2Florida Loan & Trust Co. v. Crabb, supra note 328, followed as the law
of Florida in Libby v. Beverly, 263 Fed. 63 (C. C. A. Sth 1920).
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exceed $1,000 before the unsecured creditors acquire any right thereto.3 3 0
In essence, the homesteader has a cushion of $1,000 in value limit, upon
which our chameleon permanently rests.3 3 1 The substance of the cushion
may vary from day to day, but the form and size remain the same.
2. Transfer Inter Vivos
In the last analysis, though our chameleon is visible in transfers inter
vivos, the fact is that he remains at home on the $1,000 cushion of the
homesteader. His mission is merely to validate the conveyance; he does not
follow the property. Of course, what the homesteader receives in return
becomes stuffing for the cushion; and, as we have noted, fraudulent con-
veyances will not be tolerated. The specific portion of the cushion that
is conveyed may seem at first to carry the chameleon with it, but in the
hands of the transferee it is not guarded by the chameleon; its protection
rests on the familiar principle that property of one individual cannot be
seized to pay the debt of another.
To repeat, the cushion may not be overstuffed, nor may material not
in it be transferred in fraud of creditors; but none of the stuffing ever be-
longs to the creditors, and accordingly this may be transferred at will. 3 3 2
3. Transfer at Death
Our chameleon is rather like a faithful dog; when his master dies he
either remains on the cushion or perishes with his master. He cannot steer
the cushion, as he does in the case of realty; its future possessor is deter-
mined by the homesteader's will3 3 3 or alternatively by the law of intestate
succession in Florida.3 3 4
In either event the only way to find the chameleon is to look for all
or part of the cushion among the belongings of the widow, the heirs, or
both. To the exact extent of the cushion or any piece of it in their posses-
8 .Shollar Crate and Box Co. v. Passmore, 148 Fla. 466, 4 So.2d 530 (1941);
Sneed v. Davis, 135 Fla. 271, 184 So. 865 (1938).
131lbid.
"32The matter is well analyzed by Buford, J., in Sneed v. Davis, 135 Fla. 271, 184
So. 865 (1938).
...This is settled in the classic opinion of Taylor, C. J., in Hinson v. Booth,
39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687 (1897).
...FLA. STAT. §731.23 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
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sion, he retains his footing;83 5 but if his master wishes to bequeath the
cushion to others the law imposes no bar, and the chameleon abdicates in
favor of the rules governing bequests by testators not homesteaders.3 3 6
The cushion or portion thereof must then attempt to pass unescorted; a
bequest to others than the widow or heirs unseats the chameleon at the
very moment the testator dies, and the bequest may accordingly be com-
pelled to yield to the claims of creditors against the estate.
" Seashole v. O'Shields, 139 Fla. 839, 191 So. 74 (1939).
3"FLA. STAT. §731.05 (Cum. Supp. 1947); the inurement of the exemption is
not accorded to others than the "widow and heirs" by FLA. CONST. Art. X, §2.
ARTICLE X
HoMEsTEAD AND ExEmyTioNs
SEcTION 1. Exemption of homestead; extent.-A homestead to the extent of
one hundred and sixty acres of land, or the half of one acre within the limits of
any incorporated city or town, owned by the head of a family residing in this State,
together with one thousand dollars worth of personal property, and the improvements
on the real estate, shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and
the real estate shall not be alienable without the joint consent of husband and wife,
when that relation exists. But no property shall be exempt from sale for taxes or
assessments or for the payment of obligations contracted for the purchase of said
property, or for the erection or repair of improvements on the real estate. exempted,
or for house, field or other labor performed on the same. The exemption herein
provided for in a city or town shall not extend to more improvements or buildings
than the residence and business house of the owner; and no judgment or decree or
execution shall be a lien upon exempted property except as provided in this Article.
Srcuoir 2. Exemption to inure to widow and heirs.-The exemptions provided
for in section one shall inure to the widow and heirs of the party entitled to such
exemption, and shall apply to all debts, except as specified in said section.
SEmcToN 3. Exemptions in former constitution; apPlicability.-The exemptions
provided for in the Constitution of this State adopted in 1868 shall apply as to all
debts contracted and judgments rendered since the adoption thereof and prior to
the adoption of this Constitution.
SECo 4. Homestead may be alienated by.husband and wife.-Nothing in this
Article shall be construed to prevent the holder of a homestead from alienating his
or her homestead so exempted by dee4 or mortgage duly executed by himself or her-
self, and by husband and wife, if such relation exists; nor if the holder be without
children to prevent him or her from disposing of his or her homestead by will in a
manner prescribed by law.
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SECxION 5. Homestead area not reduced by subsequent indusion in municipality.
-No homestead provided for in section one shall be reduced in area on account of its
being subsequently included within the limits of an incorporated city or town, without
the consent of the owner.
SEcTo 6. Legislature to enact laws to enforce article.-The Legislature shall
enact such laws as may be necessary to enforce the provisions of this Article.
SECTION 7. Exemption of homestead from taxation.-Every person who has the
legal title or beneficial title in equity to real property in this State and who resides
thereon and in good faith makes the same his or her permanent home, or the
permanent home of another or others legally or naturally dependent upon said
person, shall be entitled to an exemption from all taxation, except for assessments
for special benefits, up to the assessed valuation of Five Thousand Dollars on the
said home and contiguous real property, as defined in Article 10, Section 1, of the
Constitution, for the year 1939 and thereafter. Said title may be held by the en-
tireties, jointly, or in common with others, and said exemption may be apportioned
among such of the owners as shall reside thereon, as their respective interests shall
appear, but no such exemption of more than Five Thousand Dollars shall be allowed
to any one person or any one dwelling house, nor shall the amount of the exemption
allowed any person exceed the proportionate assessed valuation based on the interest
owned by such person. The Legislature may prescribe appropriate and reasonable
laws regulating the manner of establishing the right to said exemption.
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